Washington University in St. Louis

Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and
Dissertations

Arts & Sciences

Spring 5-15-2021

Fearful Versus Dismissive Beliefs about Emotion: Divergent
Pathways to Non-Acceptance of Emotion
Natasha Haradhvala Bailen
Washington University in St. Louis

Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Bailen, Natasha Haradhvala, "Fearful Versus Dismissive Beliefs about Emotion: Divergent Pathways to
Non-Acceptance of Emotion" (2021). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2393.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/2393

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
digital@wumail.wustl.edu.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Division of Psychological and Brain Sciences

Dissertation Examination Committee:
Renee J. Thompson, Chair
Tammy English
Josh Jackson
Shannon Lenze
Tom Oltmanns

Fearful Versus Dismissive Beliefs about Emotion:
Divergent Pathways to Non-Acceptance of Emotion
by
Natasha H. Bailen

A dissertation presented to
the Graduate School
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

August 2021
St. Louis, Missouri

© 2021, Natasha H. Bailen

Table of Contents
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. vi
Abstract of the Dissertation ................................................................................................. vii
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Non-Acceptance of Emotion and Depression .............................................................................1
1.2 Beliefs About Emotion and Non-Acceptance of Emotion ............................................................2
1.3 Categorizing Beliefs about Emotion ...........................................................................................3
1.4 A Two-Category Theoretical Framework of Beliefs About Emotion .............................................5
1.5 Negative Emotion and Emotional Clarity ...................................................................................6
1.6 Beliefs About Emotion and Depression .....................................................................................7
1.7 The Proposed Model: Divergent Pathways to Non-Acceptance of Emotion.................................8
1.8 The Role of Age ........................................................................................................................9
1.9 The Present Research ............................................................................................................. 10

Chapter 2: Study 1 ............................................................................................................... 12
2.1 Method .................................................................................................................................. 12
2.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................................................ 12
2.1.2 Procedure .................................................................................................................................................. 12
2.1.3 Measures Administered via Online Survey ............................................................................................... 14
2.1.4 Measure Administered during Lab Session ............................................................................................... 16
2.1.5 Data Analytic Plan ...................................................................................................................................... 16

2.2 Results ................................................................................................................................... 19
2.2.1 Descriptive and Diagnostic Analyses ......................................................................................................... 19
2.2.2 Test of Hypothesis 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Beliefs About Emotions ...................................... 20
2.2.3 Test of Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Indirect Effects on Non-Acceptance of Emotion ..................................... 21
2.2.4 Test of Hypotheses 3a and 3b: Indirect Effects on Depression................................................................. 22

2.3 Study 1 Summary & Interim Discussion ................................................................................... 22

Chapter 3: Study 2 ............................................................................................................... 28
3.1 Method .................................................................................................................................. 30
3.1.1 Participants ................................................................................................................................................ 30
3.1.2 Procedure .................................................................................................................................................. 32
3.1.3 Self-Report Measures Administered during Lab Session .......................................................................... 33
3.1.4 Diagnostic interview .................................................................................................................................. 34
3.1.5 Experience Sampling Measures ................................................................................................................. 34

ii

3.1.6 Data Analytic Plan ...................................................................................................................................... 37

3.2 Results ................................................................................................................................... 39
3.2.1 Descriptive and diagnostic analyses .......................................................................................................... 39
3.2.2 Test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Indirect Effects on Non-Acceptance of Emotion ..................................... 41
3.2.3 Test of Hypothesis 1c: Pathway Comparisons Across Diagnostic Groups................................................. 42
3.2.4 Test of Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Indirect Effects on Depressive Symptoms ............................................... 42
3.2.5 Test of Hypothesis 2c: Pathway Comparisons Across Diagnostic Groups................................................. 43
3.2.6 Test of Hypothesis 3: Mean Comparisons Across Diagnostic Groups ....................................................... 43

3.3 Study 2 Summary & Interim Discussion ................................................................................... 44

Chapter 4: General Discussion .............................................................................................. 48
4.1 Factor Structure of Beliefs About Emotions ............................................................................. 48
4.2 Indirect Effects on Non-Acceptance of Emotion ....................................................................... 49
4.3 Indirect Effects on Depressive Symptoms ................................................................................ 51
4.4 Age as a Moderator of Indirect Effects .................................................................................... 53
4.5 Comparisons of Clinical Groups: Mean Levels and Strength of Pathways .................................. 55
4.6 Future Directions .................................................................................................................... 58

References........................................................................................................................... 62
Figures and Tables ............................................................................................................... 79
Appendix ............................................................................................................................. 90

iii

List of Figures
Figure 1: A conceptual model of the role of emotions in the development of depression.…… 79
Figure 2: Confirmatory factor analyses testing beliefs about emotion as a) four latent factors, b)
one hierarchical latent factor, and c) two hierarchical latent factors………………………….. 80
Figure 3: Structural equation model testing Study 1 Hypothesis 2…………………………… 81
Figure 4: Structural equation model testing Study 1 Hypothesis 3…………………………… 82
Figure 5: Structural equation model testing Study 2 Hypothesis 1…………………………… 83
Figure 6: Structural equation model testing Study 2 Hypothesis 2…………………………… 84

iv

List of Tables
Table 1: Descriptive data for Study 1 variable total scores..…………………………………… 85
Table 2: Pearson correlations between total scores of Study 1 variables.……………..……….. 86
Table 3: Descriptive data for Study 2 variable total scores. …………………………………… 87
Table 4: Demographic and clinical characteristics of Study 2 participants. …………………… 88
Table 5: Pearson correlations between total scores of Study 2 variables......................................89

v

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. Renee Thompson, my academic advisor, for her guidance and support
throughout my time as a student at Washington University in St. Louis. I would also like to
extend thanks to the other members of my thesis committee: Dr. Tammy English, Dr. Josh
Jackson, Dr. Shannon Lenze, and Dr. Tom Oltmanns. Finally, I would like to thank the members
of the Emotion and Mental Health Lab (Daphne Liu and Alison Tuck) for their invaluable input
throughout the dissertation process.

Natasha Bailen

Washington University in St. Louis

August 2021

vi

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Fearful Versus Dismissive Beliefs about Emotion:
Divergent Pathways to Non-Acceptance of Emotion
by
Natasha H. Bailen
Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Renee J. Thompson, Chair
High non-acceptance of emotion, or the rejection of one’s own emotional experience as
bad or unacceptable, is consistently associated with depressive pathology, including elevated
depressive symptoms and past and current major depressive (MDD) diagnoses. To progress
toward a fuller understanding of non-acceptance and depressive pathology, it is important to
identify other associated constructs that could theoretically contribute to this association. Indirect
evidence suggests that negative beliefs about emotion—that is, stable underlying negative beliefs
about the meaning, value, or consequences of one’s emotions—could be one such factor, as
could negative emotion intensity and emotional clarity (or the degree to which one can identify,
distinguish, and describe one's emotions). In the present research, we tested the hypotheses that
beliefs about emotions (1) could be best represented by a two-factor model; (2) would have
indirect positive associations with non-acceptance of emotion through high negative emotion
intensity and low emotional clarity; and (3) would have indirect positive associations with
depressive symptoms through high non-acceptance of emotion. Further, we expected that these
three indirect associations would be moderated by age, such that the associations would weaken
as age increased. Finally, we tested whether mean levels and dynamic associations between
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variables varied as by depression status. In Study 1, participants included 410 adults (Mage =
44.1, SD = 15.6) recruited from the community who completed self-report measures of negative
beliefs about emotions, non-acceptance, negative emotion intensity, emotional clarity, and
depressive symptomatology. In Study 2, we used an intensive longitudinal design, in which a
subset of 215 participants (Mage = 44.3, SD = 16.1) from Study 1 reported five times a day for
two weeks on their emotional experiences. These participants were clinically interviewed and
met diagnostic criteria for one of three groups: current depressed (n = 48), remitted depressed (n
= 80), and healthy control (n = 87). In Study 1, we found that a single-factor, not a two-factor,
hierarchical model was the best fit to the beliefs about emotions data. In both studies, we found
support for a positive indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on non-acceptance of emotion
through negative emotion intensity, but not through emotional clarity. In Study 1, but not Study
2, we found support for a positive indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on depressive
symptoms through non-acceptance of emotion. As expected, we found in Study 2 that mean
levels of negative beliefs about emotions, non-acceptance of emotion, and negative emotion
intensity varied across diagnostic groups, but the strengths of pathways did not vary, suggesting
that elevated levels of these emotional characteristics are just as maladaptive in healthy controls
as they are in individuals with a current or past history of depression. The present study is the
first to illuminate the association between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion
in community and clinical samples. Our findings also build on clinical theory to suggest that
intensity of emotion mediates this link, such that high negative emotion helps explain the relation
between high negative beliefs about emotion and high non-acceptance of emotion. Our findings
from Study 1 also implicate non-acceptance of emotion as a mediator of the association between
beliefs about emotions and depressive symptoms; however, given that Study 2 did not confirm
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these findings, future (ideally longitudinal) research is needed to further examine these
associations.

ix

Chapter 1: Introduction
People vary in the degree to which they accept versus reject their own emotional
experiences-- i.e., non-acceptance of emotion (e.g., Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Hayes, Follette, &
Linehan, 2004). High non-acceptance of emotion, or the rejection of one’s own emotional
experience as bad or unacceptable, is consistently associated with both subclinical depressive
symptoms and clinically diagnosed depressive disorders (e.g., Bakhshaie et al., 2014;
Brockmeyer et al., 2012). In order to understand how non-acceptance fits into the bigger clinical
picture of depressive pathology, it is important to identify other constructs that could
theoretically contribute to this association. In this two-study dissertation using cross-sectional
(Study 1) and intensive longitudinal (Study 2) data, we test a conceptual model in which
depression is rooted in two proposed categories of stable underlying beliefs about emotion, and
in which these pathways are explained by non-acceptance of emotion.
1.1 Non-Acceptance of Emotion and Depression
Non-acceptance of emotion has strong associations with depressive pathology in both
community and clinical samples (Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010;
Flynn, Hollenstein, & Mackey, 2010; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Neumann, van Lier, Gratz, &
Koot, 2010; Saxena, Dubey, & Pandey, 2011). In community samples, non-acceptance of
emotion is positively associated with depressive symptoms in both adolescents (Flynn et al.,
2010) and adults (Bakhshaie et al., 2014; Neumann et al., 2010; Saxena et al., 2011). Similarly,
individuals with current MDD (Brockmeyer et al., 2012; Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, &
Hofmann, 2006) and remitted MDD (Ehring, Fischer, Schnülle, Bösterling, & Tuschen-Caffier,
2008; Ehring et al., 2010) show higher levels of non-acceptance of emotion (or lower levels of
1

acceptance of emotion) than do healthy controls. To date, no empirical studies have examined
factors that influence the development of non-acceptance of emotion. However, developmental
and clinical theory and research provide indirect evidence that beliefs about emotion—that is,
stable underlying beliefs about the meaning, value, or consequences of one’s emotions—could
be one such factor.
1.2 Beliefs About Emotion and Non-Acceptance of Emotion
Developmental psychologists conceptualize beliefs about emotion as being present from
childhood and arising from early experiences, parental modeling, and cultural milieu (e.g.,
Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1996; Parker et al., 2012). The beliefs that parents hold about their
children’s emotions and the ways they react to their children’s emotions (i.e., parental metaemotions) are thought to influence children’s own beliefs about their emotions (Edwards &
Wupperman, 2019; Halberstadt, Thompson, Parker, & Dunsmore, 2008). Parental meta-emotions
can include beliefs that, for example, the child’s emotions are useless, dangerous, or
uncontrollable; alternately, parental meta-emotions can include beliefs that the child’s emotions
provide useful information and should be encouraged and expressed (Castro, Halberstadt,
Lozada, & Craig, 2015; Halberstadt et al., 2008; Lozada, Halberstadt, Craig, Dennis, &
Dunsmore, 2016; Parker et al., 2012; Stelter & Halberstadt, 2011).
Beliefs about emotions are likely influenced by other environmental factors as well. For
example, as children grow into adolescents and begin to interact more with their peers than with
their parents (Schneiders et al., 2007), peers have a substantial influence on adolescents’ attitudes
and beliefs (Steinberg, 2001), possibly including beliefs about emotion. Cultural context is
another factor that is thought to shape beliefs about emotion during childhood and into
adulthood, as different cultures often place different meanings and values on emotions (Lim,
2

2016; Tsai, 2007; Wei, Su, Carrera, Lin, & Yi, 2013). For instance, East Asian cultures have
been shown to value low-arousal positive affective states (e.g., calm) more highly than does
American culture (Tsai, 2007); thus, is is possible that an individual growing up in an East Asian
household might have more positive beliefs about low-arousal states (e.g., that they are useful or
rational) as compared to an individual growing up in an American household. In addition,
parental meta-emotions have been shown to vary as a function of ethnic group (Parker et al.,
2012), suggesting that the messages parents pass on to children, and the beliefs those children
will ultimately hold about their own emotions, also most likely vary by ethnic group.
The developmental literature on meta-emotions has directly informed clinical theory
about how beliefs about emotion contribute to non-acceptance of emotion. Dialectical behavior
theorists, for instance, suggest that the internalization of negative beliefs about emotion in
childhood can promote a non-accepting stance toward one’s own emotions (Linehan, 1993). The
emotion-focused therapy literature, similarly, suggests that early beliefs that emotions are
uncontrollable, destructive, or shameful can lead to non-acceptance of emotion (Greenberg,
2006; Greenberg & Safran, 1987). Empirical work supports the positive association between
negative beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of emotion in the relation in community
adults (Ouimet, Kane, & Tutino, 2016; Trincas, Bilotta, & Mancini, 2016) and outpatient
psychotherapy clients (Leahy, 2002).
1.3 Categorizing Beliefs about Emotion
Researchers interested in the various beliefs that individuals hold about their own
emotions (as opposed to parental meta-emotions) have operationalized and empirically assessed
those beliefs in ways that capture important nuances of these constructs, including belief types,
strengths, and valences. However, as Edwards and Wupperman (2019) state, the existing
3

conceptualizations of beliefs about emotion are varied, idiosyncratic, and potentially
overlapping. For instance, how broadly beliefs about emotions are defined often varies across the
literature. Some research is limited to subtypes of the belief that emotions are overwhelming and
uncontrollable (Veilleux et al., 2015; Rimes & Chalder, 2010; Tamir et al., 2007); thus,
categories of beliefs about emotions that are identified by these researchers fall within this
umbrella category of uncontrollability, such as beliefs that emotions can hijack self-control, that
emotion regulation is not a worthwhile pursuit, and that emotions can constrain behavior
(Veilleux et al., 2015). In contrast, Manser et al. (2012) consider beliefs about emotions to be a
much broader construct, with the belief that emotions are 1) overwhelming and uncontrollable to
be one of six subordinate categories including beliefs that emotions are 2) shameful and
irrational, 3) invalid and meaningless, 4) useless, 5) damaging, and 6) contagious. Becerra,
Preece, and Gross (2020), with a viewpoint somewhere in the middle, propose that relevant
factors can be narrowed down to controllability and usefulness. In some cases, what have been
described in this proposal as beliefs about emotion are not even uniformly called beliefs about
emotion, but something else entirely: for example, the belief that emotions are uncontrollable has
alternately been called a belief about emotion (Manser et al., 2012), a meta-cognition
(Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), and an emotional schema (Leahy, 2002).
In addition to varying definitional breadth, the manner in which categories are
determined is also inconsistent across the literature. Conceptualizations about the number and
content of existing categories of beliefs about one’s own emotions have frequently been
determined by exploratory analyses of items tapping beliefs about emotions, rather than by
testing models based on theory (e.g., Manser et al., 2012; Veilleux et al., 2015; Rimes &
Chalder, 2010). Results from this work have been divergent, with beliefs about emotions being
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represented by a single broad category (Rimes & Chalder, 2010), as well as multiple related but
distinct categories (Manser et al., 2012; Veilleux et al., 2015). Research is needed to draw from
the rich meta-emotion and clinical literatures to make a priori hypotheses about the structure of
beliefs about emotions.
1.4 A Two-Category Theoretical Framework of Beliefs About Emotion
The literature is in need of a theoretical framework for beliefs about emotion that can
provide a common language for a diverse literature while still capturing important empirical and
conceptual differences between beliefs. We propose that the majority of the beliefs about
emotion represented in the literature can be represented using two related but distinct categories
characterizing how individuals view their emotions: (1) fearful beliefs about emotion and (2)
dismissive beliefs about emotion. The theoretical distinction between beliefs about emotions as
entities to be feared versus dismissed has a strong historical basis in the developmental metaemotion literature (Castro et al., 2015; Goetz, Frenzel, Pekrun, & Hall, 2005; Halberstadt et al.,
2008, Lozada et al., 2016; Parker et al., 2012; Stelter & Halberstadt, 2011).
Theories and research about parental meta-emotions have frequently included a category
comprising what we term fearful beliefs—most commonly, either beliefs that the child’s
emotions are uncontrollable (Goetz et al., 2005; Parker et al., 2012) or beliefs that the child’s
emotions are dangerous (Halberstadt et al., 2008, Lozada et al., 2016; Stelter & Halberstadt,
2011). Almost all studies of parental meta-emotions also have some measure of what we term
dismissive beliefs—that is, beliefs about a child’s emotions as valueless versus valuable (Castro
et al., 2015; Goetz et al., 2005; Halberstadt et al., 2008, Lozada et al., 2016; Parker et al., 2012;
Stelter & Halberstadt, 2011). We suggest that the same distinction between fearful and
dismissive beliefs about emotions can also be applied to the beliefs people hold about their own
5

emotions. In the proposed research, we examine four categories of beliefs about emotion—
beliefs that emotions are (1) overwhelming and uncontrollable, (2) damaging, (3) shameful and
irrational, and (4) useless (Manser et al., 2012). These particular categories were chosen because
they are the four most psychometrically sound categories in the commonly used BAEQ measure
(Manser et al., 2012), and represent a range of variety in belief content.
We propose that, instead of four categories, they can be represented by two. More
specifically, we suggest that those who believe that emotions are overwhelming and
uncontrollable or damaging share a fear that their emotions have harmful consequences, leading
us to propose a composite fearful beliefs category. We suggest that those who believe their
emotions are shameful and irrational or useless share a conviction that emotions have no inherent
value, leading us to propose a composite dismissive category. We suggest a two-category
structure could serve as a compromise between integrating findings from a diverse literature
while still capturing the conceptual granularity of two disparate belief groupings.
1.5 Negative Emotion and Emotional Clarity
In descriptions of the relation between beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of
emotion, two contributing factors frequently arise in the clinical literature: high negative emotion
intensity and low clarity of emotion (i.e., the degree to which one can identify, distinguish, and
describe one's emotions; Gohm & Clore, 2000). For instance, according to dialectical behavior
theory, the parental invalidation of emotions that shapes beliefs about negative emotion also
leads to underdevelopment of key emotion regulation skills, giving rise to a maladaptive pattern
of intense negative emotion, low emotional clarity, and subsequent non-acceptance of emotion
(Linehan, 1987; Van Dijk, 2013). Further, according to the theory behind emotion regulation
therapy, the emotion dysregulation that characterizes mood and anxiety disorders is thought to
6

arise as a response to atypically intense negative emotion, low emotional clarity, and negative
reactivity to emotion, among other dysregulated processes (Clen, Mennin, & Fresco, 2011;
Mennin et al., 2007; Mennin & Fresco, 2010).
In concordance with these theories, empirical research has found that non-acceptance of
emotion is positively associated with negative emotion intensity (Lavender, Tull, DiLillo,
Messman-Moore, & Gratz, 2017; Mayer & Stevens, 1994; Saxena et al., 2011) and negatively
associated with emotional clarity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Vine & Aldao, 2014). Of note,
however, negative emotion intensity and emotional clarity are not associated with each other
(Gohm & Clore, 2000; Thompson, Dizén, & Berenbaum, 2009), suggesting divergent paths to
non-acceptance of emotion. Despite the theorized role of high negative emotion intensity and
low emotional clarity as emotional experiences that arise from beliefs about emotion and lead to
non-acceptance of emotion, no study to date has examined whether or the extent to which high
negative emotion intensity or low emotional clarity explains the positive association between
beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of emotion, either in community or clinical samples. It
would be important to assess both whether this maladaptive pattern of behavior is associated
with sub-clinical distress in the general community and to assess how this pattern contributes to
clinical levels of psychopathology.
1.6 Beliefs About Emotion and Depression
In general, negative beliefs about emotions are positively associated with psychological
distress, including depressive symptoms (e.g., Manser, Cooper, & Trefusis, 2012; Ouimet et al.,
2016; Rezaei & Ghazanfari, 2016; Rimes & Chalder, 2010; Sydenham, Beardwood, & Rimes,
2017; Urbanek et al., 2014). Most research examining the relation between specific negative
beliefs about emotions and depression has focused on beliefs that emotions are uncontrollable,
7

and has found this belief to be positively associated with depressive symptoms in community
samples both cross-sectionally (De Castella et al., 2013; Ford & Gross, 2018; Manser et al.,
2012; Schroder et al., 2015; Tajirishi, Mohammadkhani, & Jadidi, 2011; Veilleux, Salomaa,
Shaver, Zielinski, & Pollert, 2015) and longitudinally (Romero et al., 2014; Tamir, John,
Srivastava, & Gross, 2007). In addition, the belief that emotions are uncontrollable was
positively associated with depressive symptoms in outpatient psychotherapy clients (Leahy,
2002; Leahy, Tirch, & Melwani, 2012), and participants with MDD reported higher beliefs that
emotions were uncontrollable as compared to healthy controls (Batmaz et al., 2014). Beliefs that
emotions are dangerous or damaging are also positively associated cross-sectionally with
depressive symptoms in community samples (Manser et al., 2012; Tajirishi, Mohammadkhani, &
Jadidi, 2011) but have not been examined in clinical samples. Evidence also shows that beliefs
that emotions are incomprehensible, irrational, shameful, or likely to be invalidated by others are
also positively associated with depressive symptoms in outpatient psychotherapy patients
(Leahy, 2002; Leahy et al., 2012; Manser et al., 2012). Participants with MDD had higher beliefs
that emotions were shameful and that their emotions were likely to be invalidated by others as
compared to healthy controls (Batmaz et al., 2014).
1.7 The Proposed Model: Divergent Pathways to Non-Acceptance of Emotion
We propose a conceptual model (Figure 1) in which negative beliefs about emotion,
which arise from early childhood experiences and cultural context (Figure 1, part A), are
positively associated with non-acceptance of emotion through two dimensions of emotional
experiences. More specifically, our conceptual model features two separate paths from fearful
and dismissive beliefs to non-acceptance of emotion—one through high negative emotion
intensity and one through low emotional clarity, respectively (Figure 1, parts B-D). We suggest
8

that individuals who hold fearful beliefs about emotion, for example, are more likely to
experience stronger negative emotions, resulting in non-acceptance of emotion that are both
believed to be, and directly experienced, as overwhelming. Dismissive beliefs about emotion, on
the other hand, might discourage individuals from attempting to parse the meaning of their
emotions and lead to poor understanding of their emotions, resulting in non-acceptance of
emotion that are both believed to be, and directly experienced, as useless. In our model, each of
these pathways is associated with depressive symptoms via non-acceptance of emotion,
regardless of whether the beliefs about emotion one holds are fearful or dismissive in nature
(Figure 1, Part E).
1.8 The Role of Age
A strong body of research shows that older adults have less intense negative emotion as
compared to younger adults (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, van Putten, van Emden, & Strough, 2018).
Preliminary research also shows older adults have higher emotional clarity (Orgeta, 2009) and
are more likely to be accepting of their emotional responses (Schirda, Valentine, Aldao, &
Prakash, 2016) than are young adults. Given that older adults also have a lower prevalence of
depressive disorders than younger adults (Hasin et al., 2005), it is of interest how age interacts
with the network of pathways leading from beliefs about emotions to depressive symptoms. We
suggest that age moderates the relation between beliefs about emotions and emotional experience
variables, and in this manner, moderates the indirect effect of beliefs about emotion on nonacceptance of emotion. We also suggest that in moderating the relation between beliefs about
emotions and non-acceptance of emotion (see Fig. 3 and 5), age also moderates the indirect
effect of beliefs about emotions on depressive symptoms (see Fig. 4 and 6). If supported, these
findings would provide a logical connection between prior research showing lower negative
9

emotion intensity, higher clarity, and lower depressive symptoms in older compared to younger
adults, allowing us to situate this prior research within a cohesive model of emotion-related
pathology in depression.
1.9 The Present Research
The present research is made up of two complementary studies that aim to test parts B
through E of our conceptual model (Figure 1). Combined, these two studies provide evidence as
to whether, and by what means, beliefs about emotion are associated with non-acceptance of
emotions and depressive symptoms in community and clinical samples. If the evidence from
these studies support our theory, then this could help elucidate the roles that beliefs about
emotions, negative emotion intensity, and emotional clarity play in the experience of nonacceptance of emotion.
In Study 1, we examine beliefs about emotion in relation to emotional experiences and
non-acceptance of emotion cross-sectionally, using self-report data reflecting a range of trait
emotional experiences and depressive symptoms in a large adult sample recruited from the
community. We use a community sample for two key reasons. First, it allows us to increase the
generalizability of our findings. Our Study 1 sample is composed of an ethnically and racially
diverse group of women and men from across the adult lifespan, from young adulthood to old
age. The wide age range, in particular, is conducive to testing age as a moderator of pathways
between variables. Second, beliefs about emotion and the other constructs of interest are
individual difference variables that present to varying degrees in community samples (e.g.,
Manser et al., 2012). It is important to test whether the hypothesized pattern of emotion
dynamics holds across a wide range of depressive symptomatology.
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We first test our proposed two-factor structure of beliefs (i.e., fearful and dismissive; see
Figure 2) against a one-factor (i.e., general beliefs about emotion) structure and a four-factor
(i.e., overwhelming and uncontrollable, shameful and irrational, useless, and damaging) structure
in a large unselected community sample. This will allow us to determine whether, as we theorize,
a two-category model of beliefs about emotion is a better fit than models with fewer or greater
numbers of categories (Study 1, Hypothesis 1).
We then test the hypothesis that beliefs about emotion will have positive indirect
associations with non-acceptance of emotion through high negative emotion intensity and low
emotional clarity (Study 1, Hypothesis 2a). This is supported by both empirical literature
documenting the positive association between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance (e.g.,
Ouimet et al., 2016) as well as theoretical literature describing negative emotion intensity and
emotional clarity as contributors to this association (e.g., Mennin, 2007). We expect that these
associations will be moderated by age (Study 1, Hypothesis 2b), such that the indirect
associations will decrease as age increases. This is based on prior findings that older adults have
lower negative emotion intensity (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2018), higher emotion clarity
(Orgeta, 2009), and lower non-acceptance of emotion than younger adults (Schirda et al., 2016).
Finally, we test the hypothesis that beliefs about emotion will have indirect positive
associations with depressive symptoms through high non-acceptance of emotion (Study 1,
Hypothesis 3a). This is supported by prior evidence of the positive association between beliefs
about emotions and depression (e.g., Urbanek et al., 2014) and non-acceptance of emotion and
depression (e.g., Ehring et al., 2010), as well as clinical observations about the associations
between these variables (e.g., Linehan, 1993). Based on the lower rates of depression in older
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adults (Hasin et al., 2005), we expect that these associations will be moderated by age (Study 1,
Hypothesis 3b), such that the indirect associations will decrease as age increases.

Chapter 2: Study 1
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
A total of 410 participants were recruited from the greater area of St. Louis, Missouri to
participate in a large project on emotion and decision-making. Participants were recruited
through advertisements posted online (e.g., Craigslist) and a medical school participant registry.
In additions, flyers and brochures for the study were posted at local businesses, hospitals, and
clinics. Eligible participants were required to be 18 to 77 years old, speak English as their
primary language, and have no visual impairments or severe hearing loss. Efforts were made
during recruitment to obtain a sample that was composed of approximately two-thirds women
and one-third men for each ten-year age bin of the age range. Our sample was 62.2% women,
with a mean age of 44.1 years (SD = 15.6, range = 18-77). The sample was racially/ethnically
heterogeneous (66.8% White, 22.2% Black, 3.9% Asian, 2.9% Hispanic or Latinx/o/a, 0.7%
Native American, and 3.2% multiracial, with one participant choosing not to report).
2.1.2 Procedure
When interested individuals contacted the lab, they completed a phone screen that was
administered by a post-baccalaureate project manager or an undergraduate research assistant to
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assess initial eligibility. During the phone screen, individuals were asked their age and gender
and whether they had ever experienced at least one of the cardinal symptoms of MDD (low
mood and/or loss of interest) most of the day, nearly every day, for at least two weeks in a row.
Individuals who endorsed current or past mood symptoms of the sufficient length, or who
endorsed no mood symptoms at all, were sent a hyperlink via an email message; this directed
participants to an informed consent and an online survey comprised of several self-report
measures. Those measures relevant to the present study are described below.
All participants who completed the online survey were invited to complete a laboratory
session. Of the 410 participants who completed the survey, 332 attended the laboratory session.1
To reach adequate statistical power, structural equation modeling (SEM) analyses, such as we
used, are recommended to use data from at least 100-200 participants (Boomsma & Hoogland,
2001; Kline, 2005; Muthén and Muthén, 2002). Based on this standard, our sample sizes of 410
(for Hypotheses 1 and 2) and 331 (for Hypothesis 3) were more than adequate. At the
laboratory session, participants completed an informed consent form, a depressive symptoms
measure (described below), and a diagnostic interview (described in Study 2). The laboratory
sessions (with the exception of the diagnostic interviews, which were conducted by graduate
students) were led by undergraduate research assistants or a postbaccalaureate project manager.
After each laboratory session, participants were compensated for the online survey ($6) and the
session ($12 per hour). The research protocol was approved by Washington University in St.
Louis’ Institutional Review Board.

1

Of the 332 participants who attended the laboratory session, 63.3% were women. The mean age of the sample was
44.7 years (SD = 16.1, range = 18-77). Racial/ethnic backgrounds were 69.9% White, 19.0% Black, 4.2% Asian,
2.1% Hispanic or Latinx/o/a, 0.6% Native American, and 3.9% multiracial (one participant did not report). The 332
participants who attended the lab session did not significantly differ in age from the 78 who did not attend the lab
session. The percentage of women attendees (63.3%) was marginally higher than the percentage of women nonattendees (57.7%), p = .09. The percentage of Black attendees (19.0%) was significantly lower than the percentage
of Black non-attendees (35.9%), p < .01.
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2.1.3 Measures Administered via Online Survey
Negative beliefs about emotion. Negative beliefs about emotion were assessed using the
Beliefs About Emotions Questionnaire (BAEQ; Manser et al., 2012). We administered four
subscales to assess overarching beliefs about the controllability, value, and consequences of
negative emotions. These included the Overwhelming and Uncontrollable (e.g., "When I'm
upset, that feeling takes over completely"); Shameful and Irrational (e.g., "It is never rational for
me to feel upset"); Useless (e.g., "Feeling upset is not useful"); and Damaging (e.g., "I can keep
safe if I don't let myself feel upset") subscales. Participants rated the extent to which they agreed
with each item on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). We did not
administer the Invalid and Meaningless subscale or the Contagious subscale because they have
been shown to have inadequate internal consistency (Ouimet et al., 2016; Trincas et al., 2016).
The items from the four administered subscales retained acceptable to excellent internal
consistency in our sample: Overwhelming and Uncontrollable (9 items,  = .90), Shameful and
Irrational (10 items,  = .86), Useless (8 items,  = .71), and Damaging (5 items,  = .72).
Negative emotion. We administered the Negative Affect subscale of the Positive Affect
and Negative Affect Scale Extended to assess intensity of negative emotion (PANAS-X; Watson
& Clark, 1999). Using a 5-point scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely),
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they "generally feel" or "feel on average" 10
negative emotion items (i.e., afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, guilty, ashamed, irritable, hostile,
upset, and distressed). Ratings for the negative emotion items were summed to form a composite
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negative emotion intensity score. Internal consistency of the items in the present sample was
excellent ( = .90).2
Emotional clarity. To assess emotional clarity, we administered items as recommended
by Palmieri, Boden and Berenbaum (2009) based on their factor analysis of the Trait Meta-Mood
Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995) and the Toronto Alexithymia
Scale–20 (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). The Clarity scale consists of 13 items rated on a 5point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items assess how clear
participants generally feel about their emotions (e.g., “I am rarely confused about how I feel”).
Ratings for the emotional clarity items were summed to form a composite score. The Clarity
scale has demonstrated good convergent validity (Palmieri et al., 2009), and the internal
consistency of the Clarity items was excellent in this sample ( = .92).
Non-acceptance of emotion. To assess non-acceptance of emotion, we administered the
Accept Without Judgment subscale of the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS;
Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). This subscale consists of 9 items that assess how non-accepting or
rejecting individuals generally are of their own emotions. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert
scale from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true), and are phrased so as to
capture non-acceptance, rather than acceptance, of emotion (e.g., “I criticize myself for having
irrational or inappropriate emotions”). Ratings for the non-acceptance of emotion items were
summed to form a composite score. Although the subscale is typically entirely reverse-scored to
obtain a measure of acceptance, in the present study, we have left the scores unreversed to obtain
a non-acceptance score, such that higher scores indicate higher non-acceptance (i.e., lower
acceptance) of emotion. The Accept Without Judgment subscale has demonstrated good
2

Of note, positive affect items were also administered as part of the study, but are not described here since they
were not used in the present analyses.
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reliability and validity in community samples (Baer et al., 2004), and the internal consistency of
the Accept Without Judgment items was excellent in this sample ( = .92).
2.1.4 Measure Administered during Lab Session
Depressive symptomology. Severity of depressive symptomology was assessed using
the Anhedonic Depression (AD) subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire
(MASQ; Watson & Clark, 1991). The MASQ-AD consists of 22 items rated on a 5-point Likert
scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) that assess the extent to which participants experienced
each described symptom over the past week (e.g., "Felt like nothing was very enjoyable"). The
MASQ-AD has demonstrated excellent convergent and discriminant validity in community
samples (Watson et al., 1995). The internal consistency of the MASQ-AD items was excellent in
this sample ( = .96).
2.1.5 Data Analytic Plan
We tested our hypotheses for Study 1 using CFA and SEM. First, we tested variables for
deviation from normality based on inspections of skew and kurtosis, using cutoff scores of ±2 for
skew and ±7 for kurtosis (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). Before testing our main hypotheses, we
computed zero-order Pearson’s correlations between study variables. We also used correlations
and t-tests to examine gender, age, and race/ethnicity as predictors of depressive symptoms and
non-acceptance of emotion to determine whether these demographic factors significantly
influenced our outcome variables. Of note, only White and Black groups were compared in
race/ethnicity analyses, as these groups made up 90.2% of the sample.
We tested a series of models for Hypotheses 1, 2a/b, and 3a/b. For each model, we
evaluated goodness of fit by inspecting several fit indices. First, we used the χ2 fit statistic, where
non-significance of these values indicates fit. We also used the following guidelines
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recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999): the comparative fit index (CFI) indicates acceptable fit
above 0.90 and good fit above 0.95; the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA)
indicates good fit below 0.06; and the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) indicates
good fit below 0.08. Next, we compared models and determined which model had the best fit for
the data using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), theoretic indices on which low values indicate a good trade-off between model fit and
complexity. Finally, we also drew from theoretical context to select the best fit.
To test Hypothesis 1, that a two-factor structure of beliefs about emotion would be
preferable to structures with fewer and greater numbers of factors, we conducted CFAs to
estimate and compare three different factor structures of the BAEQ items (Kaplan, 2008; see
Figure 2). The four-factor model consisted of four factors aligned with the four previously
identified subscales (Overwhelming and Uncontrollable, Damaging, Shameful and Irrational, and
Useless beliefs; Manser et al., 2012) (see Fig. 2, Model A). We also estimated a single-factor
model accounting for all beliefs about emotion (see Fig. 2, Model B). Finally, we estimated a
two-factor model of fearful and dismissive beliefs about emotion (see Fig. 2, Model C).
To test Hypothesis 2a, that beliefs about emotion would have indirect positive
associations with non-acceptance of emotion via emotional experience variables, we estimated a
structural equation model in which beliefs about emotion will be represented as one hierarchical
factor, based on the preferred model determined by CFA in testing Hypothesis 1 (see Fig. 3). We
tested negative emotion intensity and emotional clarity as multiple mediators of the direct
positive association between beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of emotion. To test
Hypothesis 2b, that these associations would be moderated by age, we included age as a
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moderator of the paths between beliefs about emotions and emotional experience variables and
examined the moderator's impact on indirect effects.
We then examined path coefficients from beliefs about emotions to (1) negative emotion
intensity and (2) emotional clarity as well as the path from negative emotion intensity to nonacceptance of emotion and the path from emotional clarity to non-acceptance of emotion. Next,
also using the ML estimation as part of the model fitting, we tested the hypothesis that beliefs
about emotion would have significant positive indirect associations with non-acceptance of
emotion through high negative emotion intensity and low emotional clarity, and that these
pathways would be moderated by age.
To test Hypothesis 3a, that beliefs about emotion would have indirect positive
associations with depressive symptoms via non-acceptance of emotion, we estimated a new
structural equation model predicting depressive symptoms (see Fig. 4). To test Hypothesis 3b,
that these associations would be moderated by age, we included age as a moderator of the path
between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion. Using the ML estimation as part
of the model fitting, we examined the coefficient of the pathway from non-acceptance of
emotion to depressive symptoms, which we expected to be positive and significant. Finally, we
tested the indirect effects of beliefs about emotion on depressive symptoms through nonacceptance of emotion, and tested age as a moderator of the direct pathway between beliefs about
emotion and non-acceptance of emotion and of the indirect effect on depressive symptoms.
We ran all analyses in the program R v3.4.1 (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing
for Mac, 2017), using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). For all analyses in lavaan testing
moderation, we imputed missing data using predictive mean matching as part of the Hmisc
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package (Harrell, 2014). We assumed linearity and tested the data for significant univariate
outliers.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Descriptive and Diagnostic Analyses
The means, standard deviations, minimums, maximums, skew, and kurtosis were
calculated for beliefs about emotions, depressive symptoms, negative emotion intensity, nonacceptance of emotion, and emotional clarity (see Table 1). Mean depressive symptoms were
similar to those found in other community samples (e.g., Bredemeier et al., 2010). The range of
symptoms we observed (22-105) included scores above the clinical cutoff of 76 (Buckby, Yung,
Cosgrave, & Killackey, 2007), suggesting our sample included individuals with higher symptom
severity; but the sample mean of 59.95 suggests participants experienced subthreshold symptoms
on average. None of the data exceeded the cutoffs for skew (all values were between -2 and 2) or
kurtosis (all values were between -7 and 7), indicating normal distributions. To check for
univariate outliers in our negative emotion intensity, non-acceptance of emotion, and emotional
clarity data, a cutoff of z > 3.29 was applied (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). One BAEQ value
(from the Shameful and Irrational subscale) slightly exceeded this cutoff (z = -3.73), but the
value was retained, as we decided it represented natural variation in the population.
All zero-order Pearson’s correlations between study variables were under 0.8, suggesting
no multicollinearity (Berry & Feldman, 1985; see Table 2). As expected, depressive symptoms
were significantly positively associated with negative beliefs about emotions, negative emotion
intensity, and non-acceptance of emotion, and significantly negatively associated with emotional
clarity. All beliefs about emotion types were associated with other emotion variables, with the
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exception of beliefs that emotions are useless, which was not significantly associated with
negative emotion intensity or non-acceptance of emotion.
Mean non-acceptance of emotion did not significantly differ by gender, t(332.42) = .41, p
= .68, or race/ethnicity, t(142.34) = 0.63, p = .53. Age was significantly inversely associated with
non-acceptance of emotion, r = -0.27, p < .001, such that with increasing age people are less
non-accepting of emotion. Mean depressive symptoms did not significantly differ by gender,
t(242.56) = 1.58, p = .12, or race/ethnicity, t(97.16) = -1.41, p = .16. Increasing age was
associated with lower levels of depressive symptoms, r = -.19, p < .001. Because there were no
differences across race and ethnicity, we did not include these demographic variables in our
models.
2.2.2 Test of Hypothesis 1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Beliefs About Emotions
Three CFA models were fit to the data and compared against one another: Model A, with
four factors; Model B, with a single hierarchical factor; and Model C, with two hierarchical
factors (see Fig. 2). An examination of absolute fit indices indicated that none of the factor
structures of Models A, B, or C was an ideal fit to the data. The chi-square statistics were
significant for Model A (2(458) = 1596.46, p < 0.001), Model B (2(460) = 1599.06, p < 0.001),
and Model C (2(461) = 1714.01, p < 0.001), indicating poor model fit. The CFI values for all
models were below 0.9 (CFI for Models A and B = .79; CFI for Model C = .76), the SRMR
values for all models were above 0.08 (SRMR for Models A and B = .11; CFI for Model C =
.14), and the RMSEA values were all above 0.06 (RMSEA for Models A, B, and C = .08), which
all indicate poor model fit. Given that Model B was comparable with Model A and preferable to
Model C on all fit indices, we relied on AIC and BIC to choose between Models A and B. Both
the AIC and BIC were lower for model B (35101.97 and 35499.86, respectively) than for Model
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A (35214.93 and 35608.84, respectively), indicating better model fit for Model B. Therefore, we
chose a single-factor hierarchical structure of beliefs about emotions, consistent with Model B, to
use in the subsequent structural equation models.
2.2.3 Test of Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Indirect Effects on Non-Acceptance of Emotion
A structural equation model was fit to the data such that beliefs about emotions had direct
pathways to non-acceptance of emotion and also had indirect pathways through negative emotion
intensity and emotional clarity (see Fig. 3). An examination of absolute fit indices indicated that,
overall, the model was not a good fit to the data. The chi square value was significant, 2(2067)
= 5584.16, p < 0.001. The CFI value was below 0.9 (CFI = 0.77), and the SRMR value was
above 0.08 (SRMR = 0.16), which both indicate poor model fit. The RMSEA value was 0.06,
just on the cusp of model adequacy.
All coefficients for this model are presented in Figure 3. All of the predicted path
coefficients were significant and in the anticipated direction, except the pathway from emotional
clarity to non-acceptance of emotion, which was non-significant. Consistent with hypotheses, the
paths from beliefs about emotions to negative emotion intensity and emotional clarity were both
significant (positive and negative, respectively), and each was significantly moderated by age.
The path from negative emotion intensity to non-acceptance of emotion was also positive and
significant. In addition, there was support for the hypothesized positive indirect pathway from
beliefs about emotions to non-acceptance of emotion through negative emotion intensity; this
indirect effect was significant, B = .23, SE(B) = .10, p < .001. Consistent with our hypotheses,
age significantly moderated this indirect effect, such that there were stronger effects in younger
vs. older adults (B = 3.7, SE(B) = 0.06, p < .05) and mid-age vs. older adults (B = 4.1, SE(B) =
0.07, p < .05). Of note, the total effect of beliefs about emotions on non-acceptance of emotion
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was also significant, suggesting that negative emotion intensity partially, but not entirely,
explained the association. There was no significant indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on
non-acceptance of emotion through emotional clarity, B = .05, SE(B) = .07, p = .48.
2.2.4 Test of Hypotheses 3a and 3b: Indirect Effects on Depression
A structural equation model was fit to the data such that beliefs about emotions had a
direct path to depressive symptoms and an indirect path through non-acceptance of emotion (see
Fig. 4). An examination of absolute fit indices indicated that, similar to the previous model, this
model was not a good fit to the data. The chi square value was significant, 2(2007) = 6076.47, p
< 0.001. The CFI value was below 0.9, indicating poor model fit (CFI = 0.77). The SRMR value
was above 0.08 (SRMR = .11) and the RMSEA value was above 0.06 (RMSEA = .07), which
also indicate poor model fit.
All coefficients for this model are presented in Figure 4. All pathways were significant
and in the hypothesized direction, except for age, which did not significantly moderate the
association between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion. As expected, the
indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on depressive symptoms through non-acceptance of
emotion was significant and positive, B = .13, SE(B) = .04, p = .02. Inconsistent with our
hypotheses, age did not significantly moderate this indirect effect, p = .92. The total effect of
beliefs on depressive symptoms was also significant, B = .50, SE(B) = .07, p < .001, suggesting
non-acceptance of emotion partially, but not fully, explained the relation between beliefs and
depressive symptoms.
2.3 Study 1 Summary & Interim Discussion
To fully understand the phenomenology of non-acceptance of emotion and depressive
pathology, it is essential to identify other contributors to and mediators of these associations. In
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Study 1, we used self-report data to examine the structure of beliefs about emotions in a large
adult community sample. We tested a series of direct and indirect effects to explain the relations
between beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of emotion and between beliefs about
emotion and depressive symptoms. We also tested whether these effects were moderated by age.
Our examination of the fit indices of CFA models suggests that of the three models
compared, a hierarchical model with one overarching global factor subsuming the existing
subscales is the best fit to the data. This is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1, in which we predicted
that a two-category model of beliefs about emotion would be a better fit than models with fewer
or greater numbers of categories. Instead, we found that beliefs about emotions can best be
conceptualized as an overarching general belief that emotions are "bad," and can then be further
broken down into four separate factors representing beliefs that emotions are 1) overwhelming
and uncontrollable, 2) shameful and irrational, 3) useless, and 4) damaging. This structure fit the
data better than a simple four-factor model, which reflected the composition of the published
measures, or the two-factor hierarchical structure, which was hypothesized to have the best fit.
The idea that these four belief types fall under one factor is somewhat counterintuitive,
given the diversity of belief content. The developers of the original measure we used, the BAEQ,
did not intend for it to be used as a general scale of negative beliefs, and never developed any
method for calculating an overarching composite score to cover multiple belief types (Manser et
al., 2012). Even among theorists who studied beliefs about emotion as a unified construct, this
unified construct has been much more narrowly defined than our general factor: for instance,
beliefs falling under the category of emotions being overwhelming and uncontrollable (Veilleux
et al., 2015; Rimes & Chalder, 2010; Tamir et al., 2007). Thus, the support found in our study for
an overarching general factor was unexpected.
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Of note, none of the models tested was an ideal fit to the data. This could suggest that the
self-report measure we used was problematic, and that the existing subscales of the BAEQ did
not adequately capture the beliefs about emotions experienced by the sample. Our beliefs about
emotions items, which we drew from the BAEQ, specifically asked participants to report beliefs
about “upset” feelings. This method of assessing negative beliefs about emotions is not
necessarily reflective of all such beliefs; for instance, some participants might believe that
allowing oneself to feel positive feelings will court bad luck. Indeed, in the time since the initial
conceptualization of our study, another research group developed and validated a new measure
of beliefs about both positive and negative emotions (Becerra, Preece, & Gross, 2020) in a
representative sample of Australian adults. Using CFA, the authors found that a hierarchical
model with three first-order factors tapping controllability, usefulness of negative emotions, and
usefulness of positive emotions and a single higher-order factor representing overall maladaptive
beliefs about emotions was a good fit to the data. It is worth noting that Becerra et al.'s
controllability factor roughly parallels the "Fearful" factor of our originally hypothesized twofactor hierarchical model, and that the authors' usefulness of negative emotion factor roughly
parallels our hypothesized "Dismissive" factor. Perhaps our omission of negative beliefs about
positive emotions contributed to our poor CFA model fit.
We examined the data and found other possible clues as to the unsatisfactory fit of the
best-fitting model: for instance, while all individual items from the BAEQ have acceptable factor
loadings for their subscales ( > .5), modification indices suggest that the factor loading pathways
for several items could be changed to improve model fit. Further, the factor loading of the
“Useless” subscale onto the global subscale is quite small (B = .14, p = .04), suggesting it does
not contribute greatly to the overall Beliefs construct. However, SEM as applied in the current
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study was explicitly used to test a hypothesis; and given that we had no theoretical reason to
think that changing these pathways was logical or appropriate, we did not alter the model further.
Instead, we proceeded with the best-fitting structure of beliefs about emotions from the test of
Hypothesis 1—i.e., a single hierarchical factor structure—to use in testing Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Consistent with past work, depressive symptoms were significantly positively associated
with negative beliefs about emotions, negative emotion intensity, and non-acceptance of
emotion, and significantly negatively associated with emotional clarity (e.g., Bakhshaie et al.,
2014; Beardwood, & Rimes, 2017). Higher negative beliefs about emotion were also generally
associated with higher negative emotion intensity and non-acceptance of emotion and lower
emotional clarity. Unexpectedly, the belief that emotions are useless, although significantly
associated with depressive symptoms, was not significantly associated with negative emotion
intensity or non-acceptance of emotion, which could indicate that this particular belief fits the
model proposed by the current study less soundly than other beliefs--for instance, the association
between beliefs about the uselessness of emotions and depressive symptoms is less likely to be
explained by non-acceptance of emotion.
In accordance with Hypothesis 2a, negative beliefs about emotion were positively
indirectly associated with non-acceptance of emotion via negative emotion intensity. This is the
first study to show such a pattern, and while these constructs were not assessed longitudinally,
the directionality of pathways between them lends credence to several lines of clinical theory that
emphasize negative beliefs about emotion as a key early contributor to other maladaptive
emotional patterns (e.g., Linehan, 1987; Van Dijk, 2013). In psychotherapy, the acceptance of
emotion is often conceptualized as a skill that is distinct from the tolerance of intense distress,
and these skills are often taught separately (e.g., Linehan, 1987). However, our study shows that,
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at least when negative beliefs about emotions are involved, these constructs might not be so
easily separable. Perhaps when negative beliefs are present, high negative emotion intensity is
interpreted as "confirming" an individual's belief: that is, that negative emotions really are
overwhelming and uncontrollable, for instance. This, then, might lead to rejection of the
emotions as bad or unacceptable. Such a temporal process, however, would need to be confirmed
via longitudinal research.
Contrary to our hypothesis, there was no indirect effect through emotional clarity.
Despite theory suggesting that both negative emotion intensity and emotional clarity may help
explain this association (e.g., Linehan, 1987; Van Dijk, 2013), our results suggest that only
negative emotion intensity plays a significant role. Given that prior literature suggests emotional
clarity is related to depressive symptoms (e.g., Bamonti et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2015), but
does not seem to play the role we hypothesized in our model, future research should continue to
examine the nature of this association.
Further, as predicted by Hypothesis 3a, we found that beliefs about emotions and
depressive symptoms were positively indirectly associated via non-acceptance of emotion. This
is consistent with prior theoretical literature pointing to non-acceptance as a contributor to that
relation (Linehan, 1993; Hess et al., 2000). The current study is the first empirical study to show
this pattern in the data. It suggests that, as theorized, negative beliefs about emotions are
associated with depression by way of difficulty accepting what one is feeling.
Age moderated both 1) the direct path between beliefs about emotions and negative
emotion intensity and 2) the path between beliefs about emotions and emotional clarity, such that
both associations decreased in strength as age increased. We also found support for Hypotheses
2b (that age would moderate the indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on non-acceptance of
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emotion through negative emotion intensity), but did not find support for 3b (that age would
moderate the indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on depressive symptoms through nonacceptance of emotion). This suggests that the primary importance of age in these analyses is in
how it influences the relation between beliefs and emotional experiences, but that these effects
do not ultimately influence outcomes further down the chain of our theoretical model, such as
non-acceptance of emotions or depressive symptoms.
In sum, we found in Study 1 that a single-factor hierarchical model was the best fit to the
beliefs about emotions data; beliefs about emotions had an indirect effect on non-acceptance of
emotion through negative emotion intensity but not emotional clarity; and beliefs about emotions
had an indirect effect on depressive symptoms through non-acceptance of emotion. However,
limitations of Study 1 included its non-clinical community sample and our use of retrospective
self-report trait measures to assess the constructs of interest. Consequently, in Study 2 we used
clinical groups with both current and remitted depressive disorders, allowing us to draw
implications with regard to psychopathology. We also aimed to increase ecological validity by
utilizing data aggregated across time from daily life.
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Chapter 3: Study 2
In Study 2, we examined our variables of interest using an intensive longitudinal design.
We analyzed experience sampling (ESM) data reflecting daily emotional experiences in a subset
of participants who have a current depressive disorder, a remitted depressive disorder, and
healthy control participants. Prior literature has found differences in emotional experiences
between such individuals. For instance, those with current MDD have more intense negative
emotion (Bylsma, Taylor-Clift, & Rottenberg, 2011; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Watson, Clark,
& Carey, 1988), lower emotional clarity (Loas et al., 1998; Thompson et al., 2017; Visted et al.,
2018), and higher non-acceptance of emotion (Brockmeyer et al., 2012; Campbell-Sills et al.,
2006) than healthy controls. Further, even though individuals with MDD in remission do not
meet criteria for a current MDE, they are also characterized by differences in emotional
functioning compared to healthy controls: those with remitted MDD have more intense negative
emotion (Barge-Schaapveld & Nicolson, 2002; Knowles et al., 2007; Wichers et al., 2012),
lower emotional clarity (Visted et al., 2018), and higher non-acceptance of emotion (Ehring et
al., 2008; Ehring et al., 2010) than healthy controls. In addition, compared to those with current
MDD, those with remitted MDD exhibit lower levels of cognitive and behavioral avoidance of
negative emotional experiences (Quigley, Wen, & Dobson, 2017). Thus, individuals with
remitted depression fall somewhere in the middle of currently depressed and never-depressed
individuals with regard to a variety of dimensions of emotional characteristics.
In addition to these differences in emotional experiences between people with varying
depression diagnoses, we might expect to see the same pattern holds for beliefs about emotions,
with levels for remitted depression falling somewhere in the middle of currently depressed and
never-depressed individuals. If the strengths of pathways between variables are comparable
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across groups, our model could explain why prior research shows elevations in other emotion
variables. That is, we suggest that elevated negative beliefs about emotions are associated with
elevated levels of other maladaptive emotional characteristics, such that mean differences
between groups in a number of variables can be traced back to mean differences in beliefs about
emotions.
Study 2’s inclusion of clinical groups and a healthy control group will help us address
some of these questions. Although scores on self-report measures of depressive symptoms, such
as the MASQ (used in Study 1), are an excellent way to capture a wide range of depressive
symptomology that includes sub-clinical levels, the diagnostic interview included in Study 2 is a
more valid way to assess the presence of depressive disorders (Stuart et al., 2014). In this
manner, we can expand our exploration of emotional functioning to a clinically depressed
population. We can also address the hypothesis that although community populations might have
lower negative beliefs about emotions, non-acceptance of emotion, and negative emotion
intensity (as well as higher levels of emotional clarity) compared to clinical populations, we
expect to find the same strength of associations between those variables in healthy control,
remitted depressed, and current depressed groups.
Another benefit to Study 2's design is that it makes use of aggregated state, as opposed to
trait, measures of negative emotion intensity, emotional clarity, and non-acceptance of emotion.
Using ESM to collect momentary reports of emotional experiences helps to minimize the
retrospective recall bias that individuals are prone to when making retrospective self-reports
(Schwarz, 2011). Depressed individuals, in particular, are more prone to retrospective recall bias
when reporting past emotions than are non-depressed individuals, and ESM can help temper this
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bias (e.g., Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), which is important given our use of a clinical sample in
Study 2.
Our Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b mirrored the hypotheses made in Study 1, with
aggregated state measures replacing some of the formerly used global assessments. In
Hypotheses 1c, 2c, and 3, we went a step further and addressed questions about individual
differences based on diagnostic group. First, we hypothesized that beliefs about emotions would
have significant and positive indirect associations with mean non-acceptance of emotion through
high mean state negative emotion intensity and low mean emotional clarity (Study 2,
Hypothesis 1a; see Figure 5). We hypothesized that these associations would be moderated by
age (Study 2, Hypothesis 1b), but that they would not differ across diagnostic groups (Study 2,
Hypothesis 1c). Second, we hypothesized that beliefs about emotion would have indirect
positive associations with depressive symptoms through mean non-acceptance of emotion
(Study 2, Hypothesis 2a; see Figure 6). We hypothesized that these relations would be
moderated by age (Study 2, Hypothesis 2b), but would not differ across diagnostic groups
(Study 2, Hypothesis 2c). Finally, we hypothesized that mean negative emotion intensity, nonacceptance of emotion, emotional clarity, and negative beliefs about emotion would significantly
vary across groups (Study 2, Hypothesis 3).
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
A total of 332 participants who completed the home survey attended the laboratory
session. Of these 332 participants, 215 were eligible to continue participation. The sample of 215
was composed of 66.0% women and 34.0% men. The mean age of the sample was 44.3 (SD =
16.1, range = 18-77). Participants’ self-reported racial/ethnic backgrounds were 69.8% White,
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19.5% Black, 2.8% Asian, 0.5% Native American, and 7.0% other or multiracial (0.5% did not
report). In addition, 1.4% reported that they were Latinx/a/o.
Participants were eligible to continue participation if, based on their psychiatric
diagnoses, they met criteria for one of three groups. For the remitted depressed group (n = 80),
individuals needed to have experienced at least two depressive episodes in full remission, as
assessed by the SCID-5 (First et al., 2014). Depressive episodes could include MDEs that were
part of MDD or persistent depressive disorder (PDD) and/or persistent depressive episodes
(PDEs) but participants in the remitted depressed group could not be currently experiencing, or
in partial remission from, a depressive disorder. To be eligible for the current depressed group (n
= 48), people needed to be in a current MDE that was either part of MDD or PDD. The current
depressed group did not require a previous depressive episode. Because of the high rates of
comorbidity between anxiety and depressive disorders (Kessler et al., 2003), people with current
and past history of anxiety disorders were eligible for the two depressive groups. Further, the
inclusion of psychiatric comorbidities in depressed groups allowed us to represent a wider range
of depressive severity in our sample, since depression tends to be more severe when
comorbidities are present (Kessler et al., 2003). To be eligible for the healthy control group (n =
87), individuals had to have experienced no MDEs or PDEs. Because anxiety and depressive
disorders have overlapping symptom profiles, risk factors, and biological markers (Gorman,
1996), healthy controls also were required not to have current or past generalized anxiety
disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, or agoraphobia. Exclusionary criteria for all
groups include bipolar I, bipolar II, or cyclothymic disorder diagnosis and current or past
psychotic symptoms. Other disorders were not assessed.
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Based on the recommendation that SEM analyses use data from at least 100-200
participants (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001; Kline, 2005; Muthén and Muthén, 2002), our sample
size of 215 was more than adequate. For instance, the results of a robustness study on maximum
likelihood estimation conducted by Boomsma and Hoogland (1983) revealed that as long as the
sample size exceeded 200, there were hardly any sample-size-related problems with nonconvergence (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001).
Of the 332 participants who underwent diagnostic interviewing, 119 participants were
ineligible to continue in the study. Of these 119 participants, 17.6% (n = 21) met criteria for only
one past MDE; 18.5% (n = 22) endorsed symptoms consistent with current or past bipolar I,
bipolar II, or cyclothymic disorder; 16.0% (n = 19) endorsed current or past psychotic symptoms;
9.2% (n = 11) met criteria for a current or past anxiety disorder without required MDD or PDD
diagnoses; 8.4% (n = 10) were experiencing a current PDE in the absence of current MDD; 7.6%
(n = 9) exceeded the age and/or gender quota for their diagnostic group; and 3.4% (n = 4) were
in partial remission from MDD. In addition, the sample of 215 does not include those who had
low ESM compliance (fewer than 20% of surveys; 5.9%; n = 7), withdrew after the interview
(5.0%; n = 6), experienced critical technical problems during ESM (5.0%; n = 6), or were
excluded for other reasons (3.4%; n = 4).
3.1.2 Procedure
After eligibility for the three groups was assessed, participants who were not eligible
were thanked and compensated for the online survey ($6) and the laboratory session ($12 per
hour). Participants who were eligible for one of the groups continued with their laboratory
session, during which they completed additional self-report measures (those relevant to present
study described below), various cognitive tasks, and an individual tutorial for the ESM protocol.
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For the ESM protocol, research assistants either helped participants to install the iOS app
Status/Post on their own iPhones or provided participants with a 4th-generation iPod Touch with
the software installed on it. The software was designed to collect data offline throughout the
sampling period so that it did not require Wi-Fi or a data plan, resulting in a more diverse
sample. A research assistant then provided an individual, interactive tutorial, instructing
participants on an ESM protocol. During the tutorial, which took approximately 30 minutes, an
undergraduate research assistant presented a series of slides and led participants through each
ESM question. Throughout the tutorial, research assistants assessed whether participants
understood the procedure. For example, they asked participants to generate example responses
for items to assess understanding; when participants had trouble with doing so, research
assistants provided them with standardized examples. Finally, participants were compensated for
the online survey ($6) and the laboratory session ($12 per hour).
During the 14-day ESM period, which started the day after the lab visit, participants were
randomly prompted five times per day during a 15-hour window of their choosing to complete
surveys. Surveys occurred an average of 180 minutes apart (SD = 62) and took approximately
three minutes to complete. The mean percentage of surveys completed was 74.8% (SD = 18.3%;
range = 20%-99%). This average is comparable to or higher than prior emotion research (Hill &
Updegraff, 2012; Flueckiger, Lieb, Meyer, Witthauer, & Mata, 2016). After completing the ESM
period, participants were sent a debriefing email and were compensated for their time ($40), with
an additional bonus for the completion of at least 80% of prompts ($10).
3.1.3 Self-Report Measures Administered during Lab Session
Depressive symptomology. Severity of depressive symptomology was assessed using
the MASQ-AD (Clark & Watson, 1991) during participants’ visit to the lab (see Study 1 for
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more details). The MASQ-AD has been validated in clinically depressed samples (Bredemeier et
al., 2010). The internal consistency of the MASQ-AD items was excellent in this sample ( =
.96).
Beliefs about emotion. Beliefs about emotion were measured using the BAEQ (Manser
et al., 2012) as part of the initial online survey (see Study 1 for more details). This study is the
first in which the BAEQ has been used to assess a clinical sample. The items from the four
administered subscales retained acceptable to excellent internal consistency in our sample:
Overwhelming and Uncontrollable (9 items,  = .91), Shameful and Irrational (10 items,  =
.87), Useless (8 items,  = .70), and Damaging (5 items,  = .71).
3.1.4 Diagnostic interview
Psychopathology. Current and lifetime diagnostic mental health history was assessed
using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5-RV; First, Williams, Karg, &
Spitzer, 2014), a diagnostic interview that is considered the gold standard for the diagnosis of
depressive disorders (Stuart et al., 2014). Interviews were conducted by one of three advanced
clinical psychology graduate students who had completed an assessment course in which they
learned to administer the SCID. Inter-rater reliabilities revealed that raters demonstrated perfect
agreement in assessing for the presence of a current MDD, current PDD, past MDD and past
PDD (k = 1.0 for each disorder) in a random subset of interviews (n = 48). Interviewers obtained
telephone supervision from a licensed psychologist on complicated cases during the participant
session.
3.1.5 Experience Sampling Measures
Emotional clarity. State emotional clarity was assessed at each ESM survey with the
single item: “At the time of the beep, I was clear about my feelings.” Participants rated the extent
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to which they agreed with the statement on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 4
(extremely). This item was adapted from the item with the highest factor loading on the Clarity
of Feelings subscale of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995). Modifications
included adding “at the time of the beep” and changing the sentence structure to past tense. This
item has been previously used in ESM research and has been shown to have a positive, but not
significant, association with trait clarity (Bailen, Wu, & Thompson, 2019; Thompson, Boden, &
Gotlib, 2017). During the tutorial, participants were instructed: “For this question, we want to
know how clear you are about your feelings: that is, how much you understand what you are
feeling. Keep in mind that this immediately before starting the survey. If you were very clear
about your feelings, select ‘Extremely.’ If you weren’t clear at all about your feelings, select
‘Not at all.’ You can also select an option in between.” This item, aggregated across time points,
was correlated with the trait-level Clarity subscale administered in Study 1 (Palmieri et al., 2009)
at .24 (p < .001).
Negative emotion. State levels of negative emotion were assessed at each ESM survey
with a series of items: “I felt [emotion] at the time of the beep.” A set of twelve emotion words
(both negative and positive) were randomly presented at each survey. Participants rated the
extent to which they felt each emotion on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 4
(extremely). During the in-person tutorial, the experimenters emphasized that participants should
indicate how they were feeling at the moment they were prompted to complete the survey. A
negative emotion intensity score was computed by averaging ratings for all six negative
emotions words, including bored, sluggish, sad, frustrated, nervous and angry, at each survey,
and these scores were then mean aggregated within person across time points. The Cronbach’s
alpha of these six items when aggregated across time points was .87, indicating good reliability.
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This aggregated scale was correlated with the trait-level PANAS-NA subscale administered in
Study 1 at .49 (p < .001).
Non-acceptance of emotion. During the survey, after participants rated all the state
emotion items, they saw the following message: “At this point, you just reported how you were
currently feeling. The next series of questions will ask you about how you think you should have
felt. These items include some of the same emotions you just reported on like happy and sad.
Your answers to these may sometimes be the same and sometimes will be different from what
you just reported feeling.” Participants were then presented with a series of items: “I should have
felt [emotion] at the time of the beep.” Participants rated the extent to which they thought they
should have felt three negative emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, and boredom) on a 5-point Likert
scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). These items were informed by items used in prior ESM
research on the degree to which people report they should be feeling certain emotions (i.e.,
“should affect”; Thompson, Kircanski, & Gotlib, 2016). Modifications to the original items
included reference to specific negative emotion states instead of general positive and negative
emotion as well as minor changes to the wording to align with our previously administered
negative emotion item. During the tutorial, participants were asked to generate four different
examples of times when they believed they should have felt differently than they felt. When
participants had trouble thinking of examples, the experimenters provided examples (e.g., “If you
felt happy that a particular co-worker didn’t get a promotion, you may think that you should not
be feeling any happiness.”)
To assess non-acceptance of emotion, we calculated difference scores by subtracting the
rating for how much individuals believed they should have felt each emotion (anger, sadness,
and boredom) from the degree to which they actually endorsed the same state emotion. The

36

absolute values of non-zero difference scores (i.e., instances in which participants reported they
should have felt less or more of an emotion than they actually felt) were used as a measure of
degree of non-acceptance of emotion. For instance, if a participant reported that she felt
“extremely” sad (a rating of 4), and also reported that she should have felt “somewhat” sad (a
rating of 2), her non-acceptance score for sadness was 2. A composite non-acceptance of
emotion score was computed by averaging differences in ratings for the three emotions and
mean-aggregating across the sampling period. The Cronbach’s alpha of these items (nonacceptance of sadness, anger, and boredom) when aggregated across time points was .78,
indicating good reliability. This scale correlated with the trait-level non-acceptance measure (i.e.,
KIMS-A subscale) administered in Study 1 at .34 (p < .001).
3.1.6 Data Analytic Plan
We tested our hypotheses for Study 2 with a series of structural equation models. We
began by examining the distribution of the data using guidelines for skew and kurtosis and
testing for significant outliers using the procedures outlined in Study 1. Before testing our main
hypotheses, we computed zero-order Pearson’s correlations between study variables. We also
used correlations and t-tests to examine gender, age, and race/ethnicity as predictors of
depressive symptoms and non-acceptance of emotion to determine whether these demographic
variables significantly influenced our outcome variables. Of note, only White and Black groups
were compared in race/ethnicity analyses, as these groups made up 90.2% of the data.
To test Hypothesis 1a, that trait beliefs about emotions would have significant and
positive indirect associations with mean non-acceptance of emotion through high mean negative
emotion intensity and low mean emotional clarity, we estimated a structural equation model in
which direct paths lead from beliefs about emotion to non-acceptance of emotion and indirect

37

paths lead from beliefs about emotion to non-acceptance through negative emotion intensity and
emotional clarity (see Figure 5). To test Hypothesis 1b, we included age as a moderator of paths
between beliefs about emotions and negative emotion intensity and between beliefs about
emotions and emotional clarity (see Figure 5).
As in Study 1, we assessed model fit using the χ2 fit statistic, the CFI, the SRMR, and the
RMSEA. We then examined coefficients of the paths from beliefs about emotions to (1) negative
emotion intensity and (2) emotional clarity, and paths from (3) negative emotion intensity to
non-acceptance of emotion and (4) emotional clarity to non-acceptance of emotion. Next, also
using the ML estimation as part of the model fitting, we tested the hypothesis that beliefs about
emotion would have significant positive indirect associations with non-acceptance of emotion
through high negative emotion intensity and low emotional clarity, and that age would moderate
these indirect effects.
To test Hypothesis 1c, that the relations found in testing Hypothesis 1a would not differ
across diagnostic groups, we conducted multiple groups analyses in which free models (i.e., in
which coefficients were allowed to vary) were compared to constrained models (i.e., in which
intercepts and path coefficients were set equal between groups).
To test Hypothesis 2a, that trait beliefs about emotion would have indirect positive
associations with trait depressive symptoms through high non-acceptance of emotion, we
estimated a new structural equation model in which a direct path led from beliefs about emotion
to depressive symptoms and an indirect path led from beliefs to depressive symptoms through
non-acceptance of emotion (see Figure 6). To test Hypothesis 2b, we included age as a
moderator of the path between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion (see
Figure 6). Using the ML estimation as part of the model fitting, we then examined the coefficient
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of the pathway from non-acceptance of emotion to depressive symptoms, which we expected to
be positive and significant. Finally, we tested the indirect effect of beliefs about emotion on
depressive symptoms through non-acceptance, and whether age moderated this effect. To test
Hypothesis 2c, that the relations found in testing Hypothesis 2a would not differ across
diagnostic groups, we again conducted multiple groups analyses, as described under Hypothesis
1c.
Finally, we tested Hypothesis 3, that that mean negative emotion intensity, nonacceptance of emotion, emotional clarity, and negative beliefs about emotion would significantly
vary across diagnostic groups. To compare the means of the latent variable (i.e., beliefs about
emotion) between groups, we conducted multiple groups analyses in which intercepts and factor
loadings were set equal between groups, so that only means are allowed to vary. We then
compared the intercepts, representing latent factor means, for each group to those of the
reference group. To compare the means of indicator variables (i.e., negative emotion intensity,
non-acceptance of emotion, emotional clarity) between groups, we conducted a series of
ANOVAs.
We ran all analyses in the program R v3.4.1 (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing
for Mac, 2017), using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). For all analyses in lavaan testing
moderation, we imputed missing data using predictive mean matching as part of the Hmisc
package (Harrell, 2014). Linearity of data was assumed.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Descriptive and diagnostic analyses
Means, standard deviations, minimums, maximums, skew, and kurtosis were calculated
for beliefs about emotion, depressive symptoms, negative emotion intensity, non-acceptance of
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emotion, and emotional clarity (see Table 3). Mean depressive symptoms were similar to those
found in other community samples (e.g., Bredemeier et al., 2010). The range of symptoms we
observed (22-105) included the clinical cutoff of 76 (Buckby, Yung, Cosgrave, & Killackey,
2007), but the sample mean of 57.78 suggests participants experienced subthreshold symptoms
on average. None of the data exceeded the cutoffs for skew (all values were between -2 and 2) or
kurtosis (all values were between -7 and 7), indicating normal distributions. To screen for
univariate outliers in our negative emotion intensity, non-acceptance of emotion, and emotional
clarity data, a cutoff of z > 3.29 was applied (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Three negative
emotion values, two-non-acceptance values, and two BAEQ values (from the Shameful and
Irrational subscale) exceeded this cutoff; however, especially given that our means for negative
emotion intensity and non-acceptance of emotion were quite low (see Table 3), we decided that
these values likely represented realistic variation in the data, and did not exclude them.
Zero-order Pearson’s correlations between study variables are presented in Table 5. We
found that only the correlation between mean negative emotion intensity and mean nonacceptance of emotion exceeded a value of 0.8 (r = .84). All other correlations between study
variables were under 0.8, suggesting no multicollinearity (Berry & Feldman, 1985). As expected,
depressive symptoms were significantly positively associated with negative beliefs about
emotions, negative emotion intensity, and non-acceptance of emotion, and significantly
negatively associated with emotional clarity. All beliefs about emotion types were associated
with other emotion variables, with the exception of beliefs that emotions are useless, which was
not significantly associated with negative emotion intensity, emotional clarity, or non-acceptance
of emotion.
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With regard to demographic differences, none of the three study groups (current
depressed, remitted depressed, healthy control) significantly differed with regard to demographic
factors; see Table 4 for group comparisons of all demographic factors and study variables. Mean
non-acceptance of emotion did not significantly differ by gender, t(141.76) = .91, p = .37, or
race/ethnicity, t(56.00) = .83, p = .41, but was significantly inversely associated with age, r = .27, p < .001. Mean depressive symptoms did not significantly differ by gender, t(139.32) = 1.61,
p = .11, or ethnicity/race, t(62.30) = -.91, p = .37. Age was significantly inversely associated
with depressive symptoms, r = -.18, p < .01, such that with increasing age people experienced
decreasing depressive symptoms. Because there were no differences across race and ethnicity,
we did not include these demographic variables in our models.
3.2.2 Test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Indirect Effects on Non-Acceptance of Emotion
A structural equation model was fit to the data such that beliefs about emotions led to
non-acceptance through negative emotion intensity and emotional clarity, with direct pathways
from beliefs about emotions to non-acceptance of emotion (see Fig. 5). An examination of
absolute fit indices indicated that this model was not a good fit to the data. The chi square value
was significant, 2(620) = 1821.00, p < 0.001. The CFI value was below 0.9, indicating poor
model fit (CFI = 0.68). The SRMR value was above 0.08 (SRMR = .15) and the RMSEA value
was above 0.06 (RMSEA = .10), which also indicate poor model fit.
All of the coefficients for paths between beliefs, negative emotion intensity, and nonacceptance of emotion were significant and in anticipated directions; however, the path from
beliefs to negative emotion intensity was not moderated by age, which is inconsistent with
Hypothesis 1b. In addition, there was support for the hypothesized positive indirect pathway
from beliefs about emotions to non-acceptance of emotion through negative emotion intensity;
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this indirect effect was significant, B = .33, SE(B) = .06, p = .04. Age did not significantly
moderate this indirect effect. Of note, the total effect of beliefs about emotions on nonacceptance of emotion was also significant, suggesting that negative emotion intensity partially,
but not entirely, explained the association. The pathways from beliefs to clarity and from clarity
to non-acceptance were non-significant. Relatedly, there was no significant indirect effect of
beliefs about emotions on non-acceptance of emotion through emotional clarity, B = .00, SE(B) =
.00, p = .97.
3.2.3 Test of Hypothesis 1c: Pathway Comparisons Across Diagnostic Groups
A model in which regression coefficients were allowed to vary between diagnostic
groups was fit to the data, as was a separate model in which regression coefficients were
constrained to be equal between groups. A chi square difference test revealed that these models
were not significantly different (2(9) = 5.18, p = .82), suggesting that regression pathways did
not differ between diagnostic groups.
3.2.4 Test of Hypotheses 2a and 2b: Indirect Effects on Depressive Symptoms
A structural equation model was fit to the data such that beliefs about emotions led to
depressive symptoms through non-acceptance of emotion, with direct pathways from beliefs
about emotions to depressive symptoms (see Fig. 6). An examination of absolute fit indices
indicated that this model was not a good fit to the data. The chi square value was significant,
2(1532) = 3662.19, p < .001. The CFI value was below .9, indicating poor model fit (CFI = .73).
The SRMR value was above .08 (SRMR = .13) and the RMSEA value was above .06 (RMSEA
= .08), which also indicate poor model fit.
As expected, beliefs about emotions significantly and positively predicted nonacceptance of emotion. Also as expected, this association was significantly moderated by age,
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such that the association weakened as age increased. However, the pathway from non-acceptance
to depressive symptoms was not significant, and indirect effect of beliefs about emotions on
depressive symptoms through non-acceptance of emotion was not significant.
3.2.5 Test of Hypothesis 2c: Pathway Comparisons Across Diagnostic Groups
A model in which regression coefficients were allowed to vary between diagnostic
groups was fit to the data, as was a separate model in which regression coefficients were
constrained to be equal between groups. A chi square difference test revealed that these models
were not significantly different (2(5) = 6.28, p = .28), suggesting that regression pathways did
not differ between diagnostic groups.
3.2.6 Test of Hypothesis 3: Mean Comparisons Across Diagnostic Groups
SEMs were conducted to compare the means of the beliefs about emotions latent variable
between diagnostic groups. The current depressed group was found to have significantly stronger
negative beliefs about emotion than the remitted depressed group, B = 1.35, p < .01, and healthy
control group, B = 1.87, p < .001. The remitted depressed group was found to have significantly
stronger negative beliefs about emotion than the healthy control group, B = .62, p = .03.
Multivariate analyses of variance were conducted to compare the means of indicator
variables, including emotional clarity, non-acceptance of emotion, and negative emotion
intensity, between diagnostic groups. No significant differences between groups were found for
emotional clarity, F(2,212) = .62, p = .54; however, significant differences between groups were
found for non-acceptance, F(2,212) = 13.75, p < .001, and negative emotion intensity, F(2,212)
= 20.59, p < .001. In particular, a Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test revealed that the current depressed
group had higher non-acceptance and negative emotion intensity than remitted depressed and
healthy control groups (p < .01 for all comparisons), and that the remitted depressed group had
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higher non-acceptance (p = .04) and negative emotion intensity (p = .05) than the healthy control
group.
3.3 Study 2 Summary & Interim Discussion
After examining the associations between beliefs about emotions, non-acceptance of
emotion, and depressive symptoms in Study 1, we aimed in Study 2 to examine these factors in a
clinical sample to make inferences about how they are associated with MDD. In Study 2, we
used self-report and mean-aggregated state data to test our hypotheses in current depressed,
remitted depressed, and healthy control groups. As in Study 1, we tested a series of direct and
indirect effects to explain the relations between beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of
emotion and between beliefs about emotion and depressive symptoms. We also tested whether
these indirect effects were moderated by age. Finally, we tested whether mean levels of our
variables of interest and the strengths of pathways between those variables varied as a function
of study group.
We first investigated the associations between key study variables. Consistent with past work
(e.g., Bakhshaie et al., 2014; Beardwood, & Rimes, 2017), depressive symptoms were significantly
positively associated with all other study variables. Higher negative beliefs about emotion were also
generally associated with higher negative emotion intensity and non-acceptance of emotion and lower
emotional clarity. However, consistent with findings from Study 1, the belief that emotions are useless
was not significantly associated with negative emotion intensity, non-acceptance of emotion, or
emotional clarity. Taken together, this suggests that this particular belief does not fit the model proposed
by the current study as well as other beliefs do and provides one possible reason for the poor fit of our
SEMs.
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In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, negative beliefs about emotions had a significant
positive indirect effect on non-acceptance of emotion via negative emotion intensity. That is, the
strength of the relation between high negative beliefs about emotion and high non-acceptance
was in part attributable to high negative emotion intensity. This replicates findings from Study 1
and adds support for a framework by which these variables might be interrelated. However,
contrary to our hypothesis, there was no significant indirect effect through emotional clarity. The
finding that only negative emotion intensity, not emotional clarity, plays a significant role in the
relation between beliefs about and non-acceptance of emotion is at odds with multiple schools of
clinical thought that view poor understanding of one's own emotions as a key factor in
maintaining psychopathology (e.g., Linehan, 1987; Mennin, 2007). Regarding age, contrary to
Hypothesis 1b, age did not moderate the indirect effect on non-acceptance of emotion through
negative emotion intensity; that is, the mediating role of negative emotion intensity was equally
strong in participants of different ages. This is inconsistent with our Study 1 findings, in which
age was a significant moderator of this association.
In addition, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a, we did not find an indirect effect of nonacceptance of emotion on depressive symptoms. This was surprising in the context of Study 1,
which found that non-acceptance of emotion was indeed a significant mediator. Given that the
only variable in these particular analyses that differed between studies was the measure of nonacceptance of emotion, the validity of Study 2's aggregated measure of non-acceptance of
emotion (which had an unexpectedly low mean and variance) comes under question. In this
model, age significantly moderated the direct association between beliefs about emotions and
non-acceptance, such that the association weakened as age increased. If we were to take these
Study 2 findings in isolation, our model shows that given a younger adult and an older adult with
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equally strong negative beliefs about emotion, these beliefs are more strongly associated with
increased non-acceptance of emotion in young adults. This would be in line with research
showing that older adults, compared to young adults, are more likely to be accepting of their
emotions (Schirda et al., 2016), and would provide evidence of one means by which that age
difference occurs. However, there was no moderating effect of age on the direct association
between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion in Study 2. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2b-- that such an indirect effect would be moderated by age-- could not be tested.
Our lack of findings indicates that age differences in the mediating role of non-acceptance are
not, as we had originally theorized, at the root of age differences in depression.
As expected, in accordance with Hypothesis 3, almost all means of the key variables
(apart from clarity) were highest in the current MDD group and lowest in the control group. This
is consistent with, and expands upon, prior literature documenting group differences in other
emotion variables (e.g., intensity of emotion, non-acceptance of emotion; Barge-Schaapveld &
Nicolson, 2002; Brockmeyer et al., 2012). At the same time, in accordance with Hypotheses 1c
and 2c, the significant pathways and indirect effects in both models and indirect effect did not
significantly differ between diagnostic groups. This finding is novel and suggests that when
variables such as negative beliefs about emotion are elevated, other maladaptive emotion
variables are likely elevated as well, and that this holds true regardless of diagnostic group. That
is, regardless of an individual's MDD history, elevated negative beliefs about emotion are likely
associated with elevated negative affect and depressive symptoms. Further, the presence of
current and remitted MDD does not make this association any stronger. Future longitudinal
research would be beneficial in further exploring these findings. For instance, a longitudinal
study with depressed and non-depressed individuals could be used to observe whether increased
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levels of negative beliefs about emotions leads to increased negative emotion intensity, nonacceptance of emotion, and depressive symptoms over time. This would allow us to test whether
the presence of elevated negative beliefs about emotions "cause" other maladaptive emotional
patterns and health consequences.
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Chapter 4: General Discussion
Non-acceptance of emotion is strongly associated with poor emotional and psychological
outcomes, including depressive symptoms and MDD. To solidify our understanding of
depressive pathology, it is necessary to further explore the nature of its association with nonacceptance of emotion. We argue that beliefs about emotions are a much neglected but key piece
of this association. In the present studies, we used trait self-report measures to evaluate the
factorial structure of beliefs about emotions. We then used both trait self-report and meanaggregated EMA data to examine how such beliefs relate to non-acceptance of emotion and
depressive symptoms. Finally, we used mean-aggregated EMA data to compare the strengths of
these pathways across individuals with current depression, remitted depression, and no history of
depression.
4.1 Factor Structure of Beliefs About Emotions
In Study 1, we conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) to test whether
a two-category model of beliefs about emotion is a better fit than models with fewer or greater
categories (Study 1, Hypothesis 1). However, we found that none of the structures tested was an
ideal fit to the data, suggesting that we have yet to identify a strong underlying structure of
beliefs about emotions. Despite falling short of conventional fit criteria standards, Model B, the
single hierarchical factor model, was the best-fitting model of the three and was used in
subsequent SEM models. Therefore, the significant causal SEM paths that were found in
subsequent analyses should be considered with caution.
Importantly, CFA is an inherently disconfirmatory procedure: even with excellent fit
measures, one can never prove that a given model is the "correct" model. Instead, one can only
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eliminate inferior models. In this regard, though Study 1 finds the model with a single
hierarchical factor (Model B) to be the best-fitting, it is perhaps more important that we can
eliminate Models A (the four-factor model) and C (the two-factor hierarchical model) as
competing models.
4.2 Indirect Effects on Non-Acceptance of Emotion
In line with prior literature (Leahy, 2002; Ouimet et al., 2016; Trincas et al., 2016), we
found in both studies that negative beliefs about emotions were positively associated with nonacceptance of emotion. Our findings also converged to support our hypothesis that negative
emotion intensity would help explain the association between beliefs about emotions and nonacceptance of emotion (Study 1, Hypothesis 2a; Study 2, Hypothesis 1a), which both confirms
and augments the existing literature in several ways. First, it replicates research that has found
positive trait associations between different pairings of these three variables (e.g., Ouimet et al.,
2016; Lavender et al., 2017). Second, it suggests a structure wherein these three variables fit
together, with beliefs influencing non-acceptance both directly and also indirectly, through
negative emotion intensity. This is the first study to show such a pattern, and although these
constructs were not assessed longitudinally, the directionality of pathways between them lends
credence to several lines of clinical theory that emphasize negative beliefs about emotion as a
key contributor to other maladaptive emotional patterns (e.g., Linehan, 1987; Van Dijk, 2013).
Third, it is notable that the same pattern of emotional dynamics that individuals reported
retrospectively was also seen when examining data drawing on aggregated reports of negative
emotion intensity and emotional non-acceptance in daily life. Not only are people’s beliefs about
emotions related to their judgments about how badly they generally feel or how non-accepting
they generally are, but their beliefs about emotions relate to their aggregated real-time reports of
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non-acceptance, which are explained by aggregated real-time negative emotion intensity. This is
a much stronger endorsement of the existence of this phenomenon than if it were found by
analyzing retrospective reports alone: as Robinson and Clore (2002) point out, state reports are
less easily influenced than retrospective reports by the reporter's personal cognitive biases.
This framework, by which emotional intensity explains the relation between negative
beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion, is in line with theoretical and clinical
treatment literature. On the most basic level, if we conceptualize non-acceptance as a mental
"behavior," our findings are in line with cognitive behavior therapy's classic principle that
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors are inherently related (e.g., Hollon & Beck, 2013). More
specifically, we found in our study that an emotional reaction (negative emotion intensity) helps
explain the link between a thought (negative belief) and mental behavior (emotional nonacceptance). Further, our findings are also in line with acceptance-based behavior therapy, which
suggests that learned ways of conceptualizing emotions (i.e., negative beliefs about emotions)
can lead us to react to naturally occurring distress (i.e., intense negative emotion) with nonacceptance of that emotion (Roemer & Orsillo, 2020).
Although both studies supported the mediating role of intensity in the relation between
beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion, both studies also converged to suggest
that emotional clarity was not a significant mediator. This is inconsistent with our hypotheses
(Study 1, Hypothesis 2a; Study 2, Hypothesis 1a), which predicted that both intensity and
clarity would be significant mediators. Our two studies also converged to indicate a lack of
support for any association, direct or indirect, between emotional clarity and non-acceptance of
emotion. These findings oppose prior correlational research showing that emotional clarity is
negatively associated with non-acceptance of emotion (e.g., Bardeen et al., 2012; Cooper,
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O'Shea, Atkinson, & Wade, 2014; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) as well as one study in which
emotional clarity significantly predicted non-acceptance of emotion using SEM (Vine & Aldao,
2014). It is worth noting that, to our knowledge, all prior research examining the relations
between clarity and non-acceptance has used the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale to
assess both variables (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Our use of different measures (including
ESM, which is arguably a stronger methodology) could explain the discrepancy between prior
research and our findings, which instead suggest that emotional clarity does not play a large role
in the prediction of non-acceptance of emotion.
Future research should make use of multiple measures of emotional non-acceptance and
clarity to explore these same questions. If the present findings (that intensity, but not clarity,
mediates the relation between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion) are
replicated, they can be used to guide future clinical theory in two ways. First, our findings
suggest a greater emphasis on the intensity of emotional experience and a lower emphasis on
one’s ability to identify, distinguish, and understand one's emotions in the genesis of nonacceptance of emotion. Second, given that emotional clarity is consistently inversely associated
with depressive symptoms (e.g., Bamonti et al., 2010; Thompson et al., 2015), it is likely that
clarity is related to depressive symptomology, but our study shows that its role is likely to be
independent from that of non-acceptance of emotion. Future research should continue to explore
exactly how clarity fits into the larger clinical picture.
4.3 Indirect Effects on Depressive Symptoms
The results of Study 1, but not Study 2, supported our hypotheses that non-acceptance of
emotion explained the association between beliefs about emotions and depressive symptoms
(Study 1, Hypothesis 3a; Study 2, Hypothesis 2a). Although negative beliefs about emotions
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were positively associated with depressive symptoms in both studies, indirect effects through
non-acceptance were only significant in Study 1. This was surprising, especially given that the
beliefs about emotions measure and the depression measure were the same in Studies 1 and 2,
and the Study 2 sample was a subset of the sample from Study 1, both of which theoretically
should have increased the odds of replication in Study 2.
Some personality and health-related research suggests aggregated state measurement has
superior validity as compared to global assessment of the same constructs (e.g., Brown &
Moskowitz, 1997; Augustine & Larsen, 2012), which would suggest that our Study 2 findings
were more valid than our Study 1 findings. In general, individuals are prone to reflect on beliefs
about the self when answering global self-report measures, more so than when responding to
momentary assessments (Hogan & Hogan, 1996; Robinson & Clore, 2002). Accordingly, our
participants’ self-conceptions about their own emotional non-acceptance might differ from how
non-accepting they actually are in daily life. Further, research has shown that daily reports of
positive and negative emotion intensity have incremental validity over global measures of the
same constructs (Wichers et al., 2010), suggesting that in emotion research in particular,
aggregated state measurements have enhanced validity. Together, this evidence would support
the trustworthiness of our findings using mean-aggregated data in Study 2. Future research
should attempt to replicate these findings to determine whether the indirect effect of beliefs about
emotions on depressive symptoms through non-acceptance is legitimate.
However, it is also worth noting that our Study 2 non-acceptance variable has not been
validated for use in ESM, and it had an unexpectedly low mean and variance. This nonacceptance variable was also the only variable in these particular analyses that differed between
studies. The association between mean-aggregated non-acceptance of emotion across two weeks,
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which we used in Study 2, and global self-reports of non-acceptance of emotion, which we used
in Study 1, was significant but small. Our use of a non-acceptance measure with questionable
validity might contributed to the failure of Study 2 non-acceptance of emotion to significantly
predict depressive symptoms, a finding that has been well-established in prior literature (e.g.,
Bakhshaie et al., 2014; Saxena et al., 2011), and Study 2's lack of indirect effects of beliefs about
emotion on depressive symptoms through non-acceptance of emotion. Indeed, when global selfreported non-acceptance is substituted for aggregated state non-acceptance in Study 2 analysis,
the indirect effect becomes significant; full results of this analysis are presented in Appendix 1.
Perhaps we would have been better served with a more straightforward non-acceptance item,
adapted from an established global self-report measure, as opposed to the non-acceptance
variable we calculated based on negative emotion and "should" affect. Alternately, if the measure
was not problematic (as suggested by the significant positive correlation with retrospectively
reported non-acceptance of emotion), but our time frame was too short to capture a wider range
of emotional non-acceptance, then using a time period of several weeks in which we had more
opportunity to capture instances of strong non-acceptance of emotion could have lead to
increased variance and might have led to findings that were more in line with our predictions.
Future research should work to validate an EMA measure that can accurately capture a
representative range of non-acceptance of emotion in daily life.
4.4 Age as a Moderator of Indirect Effects
We had hypothesized that age would moderate the indirect effect of beliefs about
emotions on non-acceptance of emotion (Study 1, Hypothesis 3b; Study 2, Hypothesis 2b);
however, age moderated the relations between beliefs and negative emotion intensity—and the
indirect effects on non-acceptance—in Study 1, but not Study 2. More specifically, in Study 1,
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the explanatory role of negative emotion intensity in the relation between beliefs about emotions
and non-acceptance decreased in strength as age increased. If we were to take the Study 1
findings in isolation, our model shows that given a younger adult and an older adult with equally
strong negative beliefs about emotion, these beliefs are more strongly associated with increased
negative emotion intensity in young adults. Thus, the moderating role of age in predicting
negative emotion intensity could help explain the decreased negative emotion intensity seen in
older adults as compared to younger adults (Carstensen et al, 2011). However, while we
expected this effect to replicate in Study 2, there was no moderating effect of negative emotion
intensity in Study 2. Although these inter-study findings are seemingly contradictory, global selfreport measures have been shown to draw upon beliefs about the self (Robinson & Clore, 2002),
and it could be that this phenomenon is stronger in older adults than young adults, leading to an
indirect effect of negative emotion intensity on non-acceptance of emotion in the Study 1 (which
used global self-report measures of non-acceptance of emotion and negative emotion) but not in
the Study 2 data (which used aggregated EMA data of the same constructs). Indeed, as memory
declines with age, aging individuals increasingly display over-generality of autobiographical
memories, relying less on specific instances and on more general information about the self (Ros,
Latorre, & Serrano, 2009).
We had also expected that age would moderate the indirect effect of beliefs about
emotions on depressive symptoms (Study 1, Hypothesis 2b; Study 2, Hypothesis 1b).
However, the indirect effect in Study 2 was non-significant, so we could not examine age as a
moderator of it. In Study 1, age did not significantly moderate the direct association between
beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance, so we were also unable to examine age as a
moderator of the (significant) indirect effect. If, as was hypothesized, it had been found that the
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strength of the indirect association between negative beliefs about emotions and depressive
symptoms decreased as age increased, such a moderating effect could have helped to explain the
lower prevalence of depressive disorders in older adults compared to younger adults (Hasin et
al., 2005).
4.5 Comparisons of Clinical Groups: Mean Levels and Strength of Pathways
We also examined group differences in mean levels of key emotion variables and the
strength of pathways connecting them. In line with Study 2, Hypothesis 3, the three groups
(current depressed, remitted depressed, and healthy control groups) all had significantly different
beliefs about emotions, non-acceptance of emotion, and negative emotion intensity. These
differences were such that the MDD group had the highest levels, the healthy control group had
the lowest, and the remitted depressed group fell in the middle. In line with our hypotheses
(Study 2, Hypothesis 1c; Study 2, Hypothesis 2c), current, remitted, and healthy control groups
did not differ significantly with regard to the strength of pathways between variables or the
strength of indirect effects. An individual whose depression is in remission, for instance, given a
strong set of negative beliefs about emotions, is just as likely as a currently depressed individual
to endorse elevated non-acceptance of emotion; and this relation is just as strongly explained by
negative emotion intensity. That is, although mean level of variables differed, the relations
between those variables remained the same.
The fact that the remitted depressed group’s scores were higher than the control group's
scores replicates existing research on negative emotion intensity (e.g., Barge-Schaapveld &
Nicolson, 2002) and non-acceptance of emotion (Ehring et al., 2008, 2010). The fact that the
current group’s scores were higher than the control group's scores also replicates existing
research on negative emotion intensity (e.g., Myin-Germeys et al., 2003) and non-acceptance of
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emotion (e.g., Brockmeyer et al., 2012). However, this is the first study to show a similar pattern
with beliefs about emotions, such that it is higher in currently depressed individuals than controls
as well as in remitted depressed individuals than controls. Further, this is the first study to
compare all three groups (current, remitted, and control) and demonstrate that negative emotion
intensity, non-acceptance of emotion, and beliefs about emotions are higher in currently
depressed individuals as compared to remitted depressed individuals, as well as when both
groups are compared to controls.
This finding raises two important points. First, the group differences reinforce the
maladaptive nature of negative beliefs about emotion. Current and remitted depressed individuals
endorse stronger negative beliefs about emotions than healthy controls, suggesting that negative
beliefs about emotion are related to both current and past depressive pathology. Second, the
difference between current and remitted depressed groups’ beliefs could suggest that beliefs
about emotions are not stable over the course of a lifetime--i.e., that negative beliefs about
emotion subside to some degree after remission from MDD-- but because our data are crosssectional, this idea would need to be confirmed by longitudinal research.
Further, the finding that those with a history of recurrent depressive episodes endorse
stronger negative beliefs about emotions than healthy controls suggests that negative beliefs
about emotions are not only a feature of MDD but could also be a feature of (and perhaps
contributor to) sub-clinical depression. Longitudinal research assessing people’s beliefs about
emotion before, during, and after depressive episodes is needed to test whether these negative
beliefs are a harbinger of future episodes or a "scar" of prior episodes. If elevations in negative
beliefs about emotion precede the onset of an MDE, for example, they could provide an early
warning sign that intervention is needed.
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The idea that beliefs about emotions ebb and flow with MDD status provides some hope
that such beliefs could be responsive to psychotherapy. Indeed, some related research supports
the idea that certain beliefs about emotions are malleable. For instance, the beliefs that emotions
are controllable (Kneeland, Nolen-Hoeksma, Dovidio, & Gruber, 2016) and useful (Tamir,
Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno, & Schreier, 2015) have been subject to experimental manipulation, as
have beliefs about the success of emotion regulation (Bigman, Mauss, Gross, & Tamir, 2016).
Given that these were laboratory-based manipulations that were meant to serve a short-term
purpose in community samples, it will be important to develop interventions that have the
potential to promote longer-lasting changes in beliefs about emotions. In individuals with MDD,
long-lasting decreases in negative beliefs could potentially contribute to decreased depressive
symptoms and, eventually, remission; and in individuals with remitted depression, if negative
beliefs are found to predict depressive episodes longitudinally, then decreases in negative beliefs
could protect against future depressive episodes.
Inconsistent with our hypotheses, there were no group differences in emotional clarity,
even though prior research has shown differences between all three groups (Ehring et al., 2008;
Loas et al., 1998; Thompson et al., 2017; Visted et al., 2018). Of note, prior studies used global
self-report measures of clarity in their analyses, while we used mean-aggregated clarity, which is
arguably a stronger methodology. It is possible that, despite prior evidence, emotional clarity
does not in fact differ across these groups. If this were the case, it would argue against the utility
of clarity-building skills (e.g., emotion labeling; exercises in mindfulness to internal experiences)
in treatments for depression (e.g., Hayes et al., 2004).
Overall, the lack of group differences in pathways between variables, taken together with
the significant group differences in mean levels of most variables, suggests that it is the increased
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levels of maladaptive emotional traits and behaviors, and not group differences in relations
between them, that play a key role in this model. That is, high non-acceptance of emotion is just
as likely to be associated with high depressive symptoms in current, remitted, and control
groups. An important next step would be to see whether these associations are temporal in nature
and test causal assumptions.
4.6 Future Directions
Our results provide us with a solid understanding of the interrelated nature of beliefs
about emotion, emotional intensity, and non-acceptance of emotion. As a next step, our crosssectional mediation findings would need to be confirmed by longitudinal research. If these
findings are supported, this would mean that a decrease in negative emotion intensity serves to
weaken the positive association between negative beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of
emotion. Further, our results regarding how these variables relate to depressive pathology were
inconclusive. Although it is clear that negative beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of
emotion are associated with depressive pathology, and are higher in current and remitted
depressed samples, it is not certain that, as we hypothesized, non-acceptance is a mediator of the
relation between beliefs about emotions and depressive symptoms.
Given the strength of our findings that emotional intensity mediates the relation between
negative beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion, emotional intensity might seem
like a logical target for therapy. However, it is difficult to successfully and directly target
negative emotion intensity itself. Research shows that a deliberate attempt to decrease one’s own
emotional state—i.e., emotional suppression—is not only ineffective, but can lead to increased
negative emotion intensity longitudinally (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). Therefore, the most
successful leading treatments for mood disorders target negative emotion intensity indirectly by
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targeting factors that lead to increases in negative emotion intensity: for instance, behavioral
avoidance, social isolation, and maladaptive thought patterns (e.g., Butler, Chapman, Forman, &
Beck, 2006). Therefore, negative beliefs about emotions might be a better target for intervention
than negative emotion itself. In this sense, the utility in our mediation findings lies in the
discovery of a process that, if it is replicated longitudinally and in clinical treatment studies, can
be explained to patients through psychoeducation and provide motivation for treatment of their
negative beliefs. Patients can be told, for instance, that in targeting their beliefs over the course
of treatment, they could find that they are experiencing less intense sadness or fear and that when
they do experience these emotions, they might be more accepting of them.
The difference in levels of negative beliefs about emotions between diagnostic groups
suggest that beliefs about emotion do change and could be malleable within a treatment
framework. However, psychoeducation and intervention surrounding beliefs about emotion are
not explicitly included in leading cognitive-behavioral treatments for depression. We suggest this
could improve the efficacy of such treatments, and could potentially included by way of
cognitive restructuring or behavioral exposures: that, for example, that if a depressed patient who
believes emotions are overwhelming learns by way of testing this thought that she can in fact
tolerate even the worst of emotions, her negative beliefs about emotion and non-acceptance of
emotion will decrease, leading to a reduction in depressive symptoms. Given that beliefs about
emotions are theorized to develop in early childhood (e.g., Gottman et al., 1996), such an
intervention might be especially successful in school-age or even younger children and could
potentially lead to lower non-acceptance of emotion (and possibly depressive symptoms) later in
life; however, these questions are as yet unexplored by longitudinal research.
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Future research should also examine how cultural factors influence the patterns found in
the present studies. Research has shown that cultural differences can influence how people relate
to their emotions and also how those attitudes, beliefs, and regulatory strategies relate to
wellbeing (Ford & Mauss, 2015). For instance, Asian Americans are more likely than European
Americans to engage in emotional suppression—an emotion regulatory strategy wherein one
attempts to control one’s outward expression of emotions (Gross & John, 2003; Mauss, Butler,
Roberts, & Chu, 2010; Triandis, 1994). Further, suppression's relation to health outcomes is
associated with race: in a study of European American and Asian American college students,
race moderated the association between depressive symptoms and emotional suppression, such
that the association was stronger in European Americans than in Asian Americans (Cheung &
Park, 2010). Given racial differences such as these in emotional experience, it is possible that the
pathways from negative beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion to depressive
symptoms that was seen in our study might have been weaker or absent in certain racial groups.
This would be a promising direction for future research to explore, and attention should be paid
to recruiting a sufficiently diverse participant sample to do so.
The present two-study project is the first to illuminate the association between beliefs
about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion in community and clinical samples. Overall,
these two studies provide robust support for the role of negative emotion intensity in explaining
the positive association between beliefs about emotions and non-acceptance of emotion. Study 1,
although not Study 2, also provides evidence of an indirect effect on depressive symptoms
through non-acceptance of emotion. Our study also highlights higher levels of negative beliefs
about emotion, negative emotion intensity, and non-acceptance of emotion--and not, as could be
alternately theorized, differing strength of pathways between those variables--as characterizing
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differences between clinical groups. Our findings suggest that high levels of non-acceptance of
emotion in MDD, for example, are not explained by stronger predictive pathways from beliefs
about emotions; rather, individuals with MDD have higher-than-typical beliefs about emotions,
which are associated with higher-than-typical non-acceptance of emotion. This finding reinforces
beliefs about emotions as an important point of intervention: regardless of diagnostic status,
strong negative beliefs about emotions are associated with other maladaptive emotional patterns.
It will be important to continue to explore the structure of beliefs about emotions and its
association with non-acceptance of emotion in MDD and beyond.

61

References
Augustine, A. A., & Larsen, R. J. (2012). Is a trait really the mean of states? Similarities and
differences between traditional and aggregate assessments of personality. Journal of
Individual Differences, 33, 131–137. http://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001/a000083
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., & Allen, K. B. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-report: The
Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills. Assessment, 11(3), 191-206.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191104268029
Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia
Scale—I. Item selection and cross-validation of the factor structure. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research, 38(1), 23-32. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-3999(94)90005-1
Bailen, N. H., Wu, H., & Thompson, R. J. (2019). Meta-emotions in daily life: Associations with
emotional awareness and depression. Emotion. 19(5), 776-787.
https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000488
Bakhshaie, J., Zvolensky, M. J., Brandt, C. P., Vujanovic, A. A., Goodwin, R., & Schmidt, N. B.
(2014). The role of anxiety sensitivity in the relationship between emotional nonacceptance and panic, social anxiety, and depressive symptoms among treatment-seeking
daily smokers. International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 7(2), 175-191.
https://doi.org/10.1521/ijct.2014.7.2.175
Bamonti, P. M., Heisel, M. J., Topciu, R. A., Franus, N., Talbot, N. L., & Duberstein, P. R.
(2010). Association of alexithymia and depression symptom severity in adults aged 50
years and older. The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 18(1), 51-56.
https://doi.org/10.1097/JGP.0b013e3181bd1bfe

62

Bardeen, J. R., Fergus, T. A., & Orcutt, H. K. (2012). An examination of the latent structure of
the difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral
Assessment, 34(3), 382–392. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-012-9280-y
Barge-Schaapveld, D. Q. C. M., & Nicolson, N. A. (2002). Effects of antidepressant treatment on
the quality of daily life: An experience sampling study. The Journal of Clinical
Psychiatry, 63(6), 477–485. https://doi.org/10.4088/JCP.v63n0603
Batmaz, S., Kaymak, S. U., Kocbiyik, S., & Turkcapar, M. H. (2014). Metacognitions and
emotional schemas: A new cognitive perspective for the distinction between unipolar and
bipolar depression. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 55(7), 1546-1555.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comppsych.2014.05.016
Becerra, R., Preece, D.A., & Gross, J.J. (2020). Assessing beliefs about emotions: Development
and validation of the Emotion Beliefs Questionnaire. PLoS ONE, 15(4).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0231395
Berry, W. D., & Feldman, S. (1985). Quantitative applications in the social sciences: Multiple
regression in practice. SAGE Publications, Inc.
Bigman, Y. E., Mauss, I. B., Gross, J. J., & Tamir, M. (2016). Yes I can: Expected success
promotes actual success in emotion regulation. Cognition and Emotion, 30(7), 1380–
1387. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1067188
Boden, M. T., & Thompson, R. J. (2015). Facets of emotional awareness and associations with
emotion regulation and depression. Emotion, 15, 399-410. doi: 10.1037/emo0000057
Boomsma, A., & Hoogland, J. J. (2001). The robustness of LISREL modeling revisited.
Structural equation models: Present and future. A Festschrift in honor of Karl
Jöreskog, 2(3), 139-168.

63

Bredemeier, K., Spielberg, J. M., Silton, R. L., Berenbaum, H., Heller, W., & Miller, G. A.
(2010). Screening for depressive disorders using the Mood and Anxiety Symptoms
Questionnaire Anhedonic Depression Scale: A receiver-operating characteristic analysis.
Psychological Assessment, 22(3), 702–710. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019915
Brockmeyer, T., Bents, H., Holtforth, M. G., Pfeiffer, N., Herzog, W., & Friederich, H. C.
(2012). Specific emotion regulation impairments in major depression and anorexia
nervosa. Psychiatry Research, 200, 550–553.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2012.07.009
Brown, K. W., & Moskowitz, D. S. (1997). Does unhappiness make you sick? The role of affect
and neuroticism in the experience of common physical symptoms. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 72(4), 907–917. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.907
Bruine de Bruin, W., van Putten, M., van Emden, R., & Strough, J. (2018). Age differences in
emotional responses to monetary losses and gains. Psychology and Aging, 33(3), 413–
418. https://doi.org/10.1037/pag0000219
Butler, E. A., Lee, T. L., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Emotion regulation and culture: Are the social
consequences of emotion suppression culture-specific? Emotion, 7(1), 30-48.
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.1.30
Butler, A. C., Chapman, J. E., Forman, E. M., & Beck, A. T. (2006). The empirical status of
cognitive-behavioral therapy: A review of meta-analyses. Clinical Psychology Review,
26(1), 17–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2005.07.003
Bylsma, L. M., Taylor-Clift, A., & Rottenberg, J. (2011). Emotional reactivity to daily events in
major and minor depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 120(1), 155–167.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021662

64

Campbell-Sills, L., Barlow, D. H., Brown, T. A., & Hofmann, S. G. (2006). Acceptability and
suppression of negative emotion in anxiety and mood disorders. Emotion, 6, 587–595.
https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.6.4.587
Carstensen, L. L., Turan, B., Scheibe, S., Ram, N., Ersner-Hershfield, H., Samanez-Larkin, G.
R., Brooks, K. P., & Nesselroade, J. R. (2011). Emotional experience improves with age:
evidence based on over 10 years of experience sampling. Psychology and Aging, 26(1),
21–33. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021285
Cartwright-Hatton, S., & Wells, A. (1997). Beliefs about worry and intrusions: The MetaCognitions Questionnaire and its correlates. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11(3), 279296.
Castro, V. L., Halberstadt, A. G., Lozada, F. T., & Craig, A. B. (2015). Parents' emotion‐related
beliefs, behaviours, and skills predict children's recognition of emotion. Infant and Child
Development, 24(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.1868
Cheung, R. Y., & Park, I. J. (2010). Anger suppression, interdependent self-construal, and
depression among Asian American and European American college students. Cultural
Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 16(4), 517.
Clen, S. L., Mennin, D. S., & Fresco, D. M. (2011). Major depressive disorder. In M. J.
Zvolensky, A. Bernstein, & A. A. Vujanovic (Eds.), Distress tolerance: Theory,
research, and clinical applications (p. 149–170). The Guilford Press.
Cooper, J. L., O'Shea, A. E., Atkinson, M. J., & Wade, T. D. (2014). Examination of the
difficulties in emotion regulation scale and its relation to disordered eating in a young
female sample. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 47(6), 630-639.

65

De Castella, K., Goldin, P., Jazaieri, H., Ziv, M., Dweck, C. S., & Gross, J. J. (2013). Beliefs
about emotion: Links to emotion regulation, well-being, and psychological distress. Basic
and Applied Social Psychology, 35(6), 497–505.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2013.840632
Edwards, E. R., & Wupperman, P. (2019). Research on emotional schemas: A review of findings
and challenges. Clinical Psychologist, 23(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.1111/cp.12171
Ehring, T., Fischer, S., Schnülle, J., Bösterling, A., & Tuschen-Caffier, B. (2008). Characteristics
of emotion regulation in recovered depressed versus never depressed individuals.
Personality and Individual Differences, 44(7), 1574-1584.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2008.01.013
Ehring, T., Tuschen-Caffier, B., Schnülle, J., Fischer, S., & Gross, J. J. (2010). Emotion
regulation and vulnerability to depression: Spontaneous versus instructed use of emotion
suppression and reappraisal. Emotion, 10(4), 563-572. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019010
First, M. B., Williams, J. B. W., Karg, R. S., & Spitzer, R. L. (2014). Structured clinical
interview for DSM-5 disorders–research version (SCID-5-RV). Arlington: American
Psychiatric Association.
Flueckiger, L., Lieb, R., Meyer, A. H., Witthauer, C., & Mata, J. (2016). The importance of
physical activity and sleep for affect on stressful days: Two intensive longitudinal
studies. Emotion, 16(4), 488-497. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000143
Flynn, J. J., Hollenstein, T., & Mackey, A. (2010). The effect of suppressing and not accepting
emotions on depressive symptoms: Is suppression different for men and women?
Personality and Individual Differences, 49(6), 582–586.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.022

66

Ford, B. Q., & Gross, J. J. (2018). Why beliefs about emotion matter: An emotion-regulation
perspective. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28(1), 74-81.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418806697
Ford, B. Q., & Mauss, I. B. (2015). Culture and emotion regulation. Current Opinion in
Psychology, 3, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2014.12.004
Goetz T., Frenzel, A. C., Pekrun, R., & Hall, N. (2005). Emotional intelligence in the context of
learning and achievement. In R. Schulze & R. D. Roberts (Eds.), Emotional intelligence:
An international handbook (pp. 233-253). Hogrefe & Huber Publishers.
Gohm, C. L., & Clore, G. L. (2000). Individual differences in emotional experience: Mapping
available scales to processes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(6), 679-697.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167200268004
Gorman, J. M. (1996). Comorbid depression and anxiety spectrum disorders. Depression and
Anxiety, 4(4), 160-168. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6394(1996)4:4<160::AIDDA2>3.0.CO;2-J
Gotlib, I. H., & Joormann, J. (2010). Cognition and depression: Current status and future
directions. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 285-312.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.121208.131305
Gottman, J. M., Katz, L. F., & Hooven, C. (1996). Parental meta-emotion philosophy and the
emotional life of families: Theoretical models and preliminary data. Journal of Family
Psychology, 10(3), 243-268. https://doi.org/10.1037/0893-3200.10.3.243
Gratz, K. L., & Roemer, L. (2004). Multidimensional assessment of emotion regulation and
dysregulation: Development, factor structure, and initial validation of the difficulties in

67

emotion regulation scale. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 26(1),
41-54. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOBA.0000007455.08539.94
Greenberg, L. (2006). Emotion‐focused therapy: A synopsis. Journal of Contemporary
Psychotherapy, 36, 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10879-006-9011-3
Greenberg, L. S., & Safran, J. D. (1987). Emotion in psychotherapy: Affect, cognition, and the
process of change. New York: Guilford Press.
Halberstadt, A. G., Thompson, J. A., Parker, A. E., & Dunsmore, J. C. (2008). Parents' emotion‐
related beliefs and behaviours in relation to children's coping with the 11 September 2001
terrorist attacks. Infant and Child Development: An International Journal of Research
and Practice, 17(6), 557-580. https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.569
Harrell, F. E. (2020). Hmisc: Harrell Miscellaneous. R package version 4.3-1. https://CRAN.Rproject.org/package=Hmisc
Hasin, D. S., Goodwin, R. D., Stinson, F. S., & Grant, B. F. (2005). Epidemiology of major
depressive disorder: results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcoholism and
Related Conditions. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(10), 1097-1106.
https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.62.10.1097
Hayes, S. C., Follette, V. M., & Linehan, M. (Eds.). (2004). Mindfulness and acceptance:
Expanding the cognitive-behavioral tradition. Guilford Press.
Hess, U., Senécal, S., Kirouac, G., Herrera, P., Philippot, P., & Kleck, R. E. (2000). Emotional
expressivity in men and women: Stereotypes and self-perceptions. Cognition &
Emotion, 14(5), 609-642. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930050117648
Hill, C. L., & Updegraff, J. A. (2012). Mindfulness and its relationship to emotional regulation.
Emotion, 12(1), 81-90. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026355

68

Hollon, S. D., & Beck, A. T. (2013). Cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies. Bergin and
Garfield’s Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change, 6, 393-442.
Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis:
Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A
Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1-55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118
Kaplan, D. (2008). Structural equation modeling: Foundations and extensions (Vol. 10). Sage
Publications.
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Koretz, D., Merikangas, K. R., Rush, J. A.,
Walters, E. E., & Wang, P. S. (2003). The epidemiology of major depressive disorder:
Results from the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R). Jama, 289(23),
3095-3105. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.289.23.3095
Kline, R. B. (2005). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. 2nd ed. New York:
Guilford.
Kneeland, E. T., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Dovidio, J. F., Gruber, J. (2016). Beliefs about emotion’s
malleability influence state emotion regulation. Motivation and Emotion, 40(5), 740-749.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-016-9566-6
Knowles, R., Tai, S., Jones, S. H., Highfield, J., Morriss, R., & Bentall, R. P. (2007). Stability of
self-esteem in bipolar disorder: Comparisons among remitted bipolar patients, remitted
unipolar patients and healthy controls. Bipolar Disorders, 9(5), 490–495.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1399-5618.2007.00457.x
Lavender, J. M., Tull, M. T., DiLillo, D., Messman-Moore, T., & Gratz, K. L. (2017).
Development and validation of a state-based measure of emotion dysregulation: The state

69

difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS). Assessment, 24(2), 197-209.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191115601218
Leahy, R. L. (2002). A model of emotional schemas. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 9(3),
177-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1077-7229(02)80048-7
Leahy, R. L., Tirch, D. D., & Melwani, P. S. (2012). Processes underlying depression: Risk
aversion, emotional schemas, and psychological flexibility. International Journal of
Cognitive Therapy, 5(4), 362–379. https://doi.org/10.1521/ijct.2012.5.4.362
Lim, N. (2016). Cultural differences in emotion: Differences in emotional arousal level between
the East and the West. Integrative Medicine Research, 5(2), 105-109.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imr.2016.03.004
Linehan, M. M. (1987). Dialectical behavior therapy for borderline personality disorder: Theory
and method. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 51(3), 261-276.
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive behavioural therapy of borderline personality disorder. New
York: Guilford.
Loas, G., Dhee-Perot, P., Chaperot, C., & Fremaux, D. (1998). Anhedonia, alexithymia and locus
of control in unipolar major depressive disorders. Psychopathology, 31(4), 206-2012.
https://doi.org/10.1159/000029041
Lorenzetti, V., Allen, N. B., Whittle, S., & Yücel, M. (2010). Amygdala volumes in a sample of
current depressed and remitted depressed patients and healthy controls. Journal of
Affective Disorders, 120(1-3), 112–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2009.04.021
Lozada, F. T., Halberstadt, A. G., Craig, A. B., Dennis, P. A., & Dunsmore, J. C. (2016).
Parents’ beliefs about children’s emotions and parents’ emotion-related conversations

70

with their children. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 25(5), 1525-1538.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10826-015-0325-1
Manser, R., Cooper, M., & Trefusis, J. (2012). Beliefs about emotions as a metacognitive
construct: Initial development of a self‐report questionnaire measure and preliminary
investigation in relation to emotion regulation. Clinical Psychology &
Psychotherapy, 19(3), 235-246. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpp.745
Mayer, J. D., & Stevens, A. A. (1994). An emerging understanding of the reflective (meta-)
experience of mood. Journal of Research in Personality, 28(3), 351-373.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.1994.1025
Mennin, D. S., Holaway, R. M., Fresco, D. M., Moore, M. T., & Heimberg, R. G. (2007).
Delineating components of emotion and its dysregulation in anxiety and mood
psychopathology. Behavior Therapy, 38(3), 284-302.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2006.09.001
Mennin, D. S., & Fresco, D. M. (2010). Emotion regulation as an integrative framework for
understanding and treating psychopathology. In A. M. Kring & D. M. Sloan (Eds.),
Emotion regulation and psychopathology: A transdiagnostic approach to etiology and
treatment (p. 356–379). The Guilford Press.
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2002). How to use a Monte Carlo study to decide on sample
size and determine power. Structural Equation Modeling, 9(4), 599-620.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328007SEM0904_8
Myin-Germeys, I., Peeters, F., Havermans, R., Nicolson, N. A., Delespaul, P., deVries, M., &
Van Os, J. (2003). Emotional reactivity to daily life stress in psychosis and affective

71

disorder: An experience sampling study. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 107, 124–131.
https://doi.org/10.1034/j.1600-0447.2003.02025.x
Neumann, A., van Lier, P. A., Gratz, K. L., & Koot, H. M. (2010). Multidimensional assessment
of emotion regulation difficulties in adolescents using the difficulties in emotion
regulation scale. Assessment, 17, 138-149. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191109349579
Orgeta, V. (2009). Specificity of age differences in emotion regulation. Aging and Mental
Health, 13(6), 818-826. https://doi.org/10.1080/13607860902989661
Ouimet, A. J., Kane, L., & Tutino, J. S. (2016). Fear of anxiety or fear of emotions? Anxiety
sensitivity is indirectly related to anxiety and depressive symptoms via emotion
regulation. Cogent Psychology, 3(1), 1249132.
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2016.1249132
Palmieri, P. A., Boden, M. T., & Berenbaum, H. (2009). Measuring clarity of and attention to
emotions. Journal of Personality Assessment, 91(6), 560-567.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223890903228539
Parker, A. E., Halberstadt, A. G., Dunsmore, J. C., Townley, G., Bryant Jr, A., Thompson, J. A.,
& Beale, K. S. (2012). "Emotions are a window into one's heart": A qualitative analysis
of parental beliefs about children's emotions across three ethnic groups. Monographs of
the Society for Research in Child Development, 77(3), 1-136.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5834.2012.00676.x
R Core Team (2017). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL http://www.R-project.org/.

72

Rezaei, M. & Ghazanfari, F. (2016). The role of childhood trauma, early maladaptive schemas,
emotional schemas and experimental avoidance on depression: A structural equation
modeling. Psychiatry Research, 246, 407-414. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2016.10.037
Rimes, K. A., & Chalder, T. (2010). The Beliefs about Emotions Scale: Validity, reliability and
sensitivity to change. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 68(3), 285–292.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2009.09.014
Robinson, M. D., & Clore, G. L. (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility model
of emotional self-report. Psychological Bulletin, 128(6), 934–960.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.6.934
Roemer, L., & Orsillo, S. M. (2020). Acceptance-Based Behavioral Therapy: Treating Anxiety
and Related Challenges. Guilford Press.
Romero, C., Master, A., Paunesku, D., Dweck, C. S., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Academic and
emotional functioning in middle school: The role of implicit theories. Emotion, 14, 227–
234. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035490
Ros, L., Latorre, J. M., & Serrano, J. P. (2010). Working memory capacity and overgeneral
autobiographical memory in young and older adults. Neuropsychology, Development, and
Cognition. Section B, Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition, 17(1), 89–107.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13825580903042650
Rosseel, Yves. (2012). lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. Journal of
Statistical Software, 48(2), 1-36. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v048.i02
Salovey, P., Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S. L., Turvey, C., & Palfai, T. P. (1995). Emotional
attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood

73

Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Ed.), Emotion, disclosure, and health, (pp. 125-154).
American Psychological Association.
Saxena, P., Dubey, A., & Pandey, R. (2011). Role of emotion regulation difficulties in predicting
mental health and well-being. Journal of Projective Psychology & Mental Health, 18(2),
147-155.
Schirda, B., Valentine, T. R., Aldao, A., & Prakash, R. S. (2016). Age-related differences in
emotion regulation strategies: Examining the role of contextual factors. Developmental
Psychology, 52(9), 1370–1380. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000194
Schneiders, J., Nicolson, N. A., Berkhof, J., Feron, F. J., DeVries, M. W., & van Os, J. (2007).
Mood in daily contexts: Relationship with risk in early adolescence. Journal of Research
on Adolescence, 17(4), 697– 722. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2007.00543.x
Schroder, H. S., Dawood, S., Yalch, M. M., Donnellan, M. B., & Moser, J. S. (2015). The role of
implicit theories in mental health symptoms, emotion regulation, and hypothetical
treatment choices in college students. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 39, 120–139.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-014-9652-6
Schwarz, N. (2011). Why researchers should think “real-time.” In M. R. Mehl, & T. A. Conner
(Eds.), Handbook of Research Methods for Studying Daily Life (pp. 22–42). New York,
NY: Guilford Press.
Steinberg, L. (2001). We know some things: Parent–adolescent relationships in retrospect and
prospect. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 11(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1111/15327795.00001

74

Stelter, R. L., & Halberstadt, A. G. (2011). The interplay between parental beliefs about
children's emotions and parental stress impacts children's attachment security. Infant and
Child Development, 20(3), 272-287. https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.693
Stuart, A. L., Pasco, J. A., Jacka, F. N., Brennan, S. L., Berk, M., & Williams, L. J. (2014).
Comparison of self-report and structured clinical interview in the identification of
depression. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 55(4), 866-869.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comppsych.2013.12.019
Sydenham, M., Beardwood, J., & Rimes, K. A. (2017). Beliefs about emotions, depression,
anxiety and fatigue: A mediational analysis. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy,
45(1), 73–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352465816000199
Tabachnick, B. G. and Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics. Pearson.
Tajrishi, K. Z., Mohammadkhani, S., & Jadidi, F. (2011). Metacognitive beliefs and negative
emotions. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 30, 530-533.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.10.103
Tamir, M., John, O. P., Srivastava, S., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Implicit theories of emotion:
Affective and social outcomes across a major life transition. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 92, 731–744. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.731
Tamir, M., Bigman, Y. E., Rhodes, E., Salerno, J., & Schreier, J. (2015). An expectancy-value
model of emotion regulation: Implications for motivation, emotional experience, and
decision making. Emotion, 15(1), 90–103. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000021
Thompson, R. J., Boden, M. T., & Gotlib, I. H. (2017). Emotional variability and clarity in
depression and social anxiety. Cognition and Emotion, 31(1), 98-108.
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1084908

75

Thompson, R. J., Dizén, M., & Berenbaum, H. (2009). The unique relations between emotional
awareness and facets of affective instability. Journal of Research in Personality, 43(5),
875-879. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2009.07.006
Thompson, R. J., Kircanski, K., & Gotlib, I. H. (2016). The grass is not as green as you think:
Affect evaluation in people with internalizing disorders. Journal of Affective
Disorders, 203, 233-240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2016.06.006
Thompson, R. J., Kuppens, P., Mata, J., Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Gotlib, I.
H. (2015). Emotional clarity as a function of neuroticism and major depressive
disorder. Emotion, 15(5), 615-624. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000067
Trincas, R., Bilotta, E., & Mancini, F. (2016). Specific beliefs about emotions are associated
with different emotion-regulation strategies. Psychology, 7(13), 1682-1699.
https://doi.org/10.4236/psych.2016.713159
Tsai, J. L. (2007). Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 2(3), 242-259. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00043.x
Urbanek, M., Harvey, M., McGowan, J., & Agrawal, N. (2014). Regulation of emotions in
psychogenic nonepileptic seizures. Epilepsy & Behavior, 37, 110–115.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yebeh.2014.06.004
Van Dijk, S. (2013). DBT made simple: A step-by-step guide to Dialectical Behavior Therapy.
New Harbinger Publications.
Veilleux, J. C., Salomaa, A. C., Shaver, J. A., Zielinski, M. J., & Pollert, G. A. (2015).
Multidimensional assessment of beliefs about emotion: Development and validation of
the Emotion and Regulation Beliefs Scale. Assessment, 22, 86–100.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191114534883

76

Vine, V., & Aldao, A. (2014). Impaired emotional clarity and psychopathology: A
transdiagnostic deficit with symptom-specific pathways through emotion
regulation. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 33(4), 319-342.
https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2014.33.4.319
Visted, E., Vøllestad, J., Nielsen, M. B., & Schanche, E. (2018). Emotion regulation in current
and remitted depression: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Frontiers in
Psychology, 9, 756. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00756
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1991). The mood and anxiety symptom questionnaire (MASQ).
Unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa, Iowa City. https://doi.org/10.1037/t13679000
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1999). The PANAS-X: Manual for the positive and negative affect
schedule-expanded form. Unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
https://doi.org/10.17077/48vt-m4t2
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Carey, G. (1988). Positive and negative affectivity and their relation
to anxiety and depressive disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97(3), 346–353.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.97.3.346
Watson, D., Weber, K., Assenheimer, J. S., Clark, L. A., Strauss, M. E., & McCormick, R. A.
(1995). Testing a tripartite model: I. Evaluating the convergent and discriminant validity
of anxiety and depression symptom scales. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104(1), 314. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.104.1.3
Wei, M., Su, J. C., Carrera, S., Lin, S. P., & Yi, F. (2013). Suppression and interpersonal
harmony: A cross-cultural comparison between Chinese and European

77

Americans. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 60(4), 625-633.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033413
West, S. G., Finch, J. F., & Curran, P. J. (1995). Structural equation models with nonnormal
variables: Problems and remedies. In R. Hoyle (Ed.), Structural equation modeling:
Concepts, issues and applications, (pp. 56-75). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Wichers, M., Peeters, F., Geschwind, N., Jacobs, N., Simons, C. J., Derom, C., Thiery, E.,
Delespaul, P. H., & van Os, J. (2010). Unveiling patterns of affective responses in daily
life may improve outcome prediction in depression: a momentary assessment study.
Journal of Affective Disorders, 124(1-2), 191–195.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2009.11.010
Wichers, M., Peeters, F., Rutten, B. P., Jacobs, N., Derom, C., Thiery, E., Delespaul, P. & van
Os, J. (2012). A time-lagged momentary assessment study on daily life physical activity
and affect. Health Psychology, 31(2), 135-144. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025688

78

Figures and Tables

Figure 1. A conceptual model of the role of emotions in the development of depression.
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a)

b)

c)

Figure 2. Confirmatory factor analyses testing beliefs about emotion as a) four latent factors, b)
one hierarchical latent factor, and c) two hierarchical latent factors.
80

Figure 3. Structural equation model testing Study 1 Hypothesis 2. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, ***
= p < .001.
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Figure 4. Structural equation model testing Study 1 Hypothesis 3. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, ***
= p < .001.
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Figure 5. Structural equation model testing Study 2 Hypothesis 1. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, ***
= p < .001.
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Figure 6. Structural equation model testing Study 2 Hypothesis 2. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, ***
= p < .001
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Table 1. Descriptive data for Study 1 variable total scores.

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Skew

Kurtosis

Belief That
Emotions Are
Overwhelming 3
and
Uncontrollable

0.9

1.22

5

0.37

-0.64

Belief that
Emotions Are
Shameful and
Irrational

2.11

0.72

1

4.8

0.37

0.42

Belief That
Emotions Are
Useless

3.22

0.65

1.5

5

-0.09

-0.09

Belief That
Emotions Are
Damaging

2.71

0.85

1

5

0.24

-0.38

Negative
Emotion
Intensity

23.02

8.9

10

48

0.61

-0.4

46.15

11.3

14

65

-0.41

-0.42

27.35

8.52

9

45

-0.11

-0.65

59.95

18.68

22

105

0.3

-0.94

Emotional
Clarity
Emotional
NonAcceptance
Depressive
Symptoms
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Table 2. Pearson correlations between total scores of Study 1 variables.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Belief That
Emotions Are
Overwhelming 1
and
Uncontrollable

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2. Belief that
Emotions Are
Shameful and
Irrational

0.58***

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

3. Belief That
Emotions Are
Useless

0.12*

0.22***

1

-

-

-

-

-

4. Belief That
Emotions Are
Damaging

0.65***

0.63***

0.17*** 1

-

-

-

-

5. Negative
Emotion
Intensity

0.65***

0.45***

0.02

0.46***

1

-

-

-

0.44***

0.47***

-0.10*

0.38***

0.49***

1

-

-

0.60***

0.50***

-0.08

0.49***

0.62***

0.44***

1

-

0.53***

0.39***

0.11*

0.42***

0.59***

0.40***

6. Emotional
Clarity
7. Emotional
NonAcceptance
8. Depressive
Symptoms

Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
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0.50***

1

Table 3. Descriptive data for Study 2 variable total scores.
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Skew

Kurtosis

Belief That
Emotions Are
Overwhelming
and
Uncontrollable

2.88

0.91

1.22

5

0.42

-0.53

Belief that
Emotions Are
Shameful and
Irrational

2.02

0.72

1

4.8

1.07

1.32

Belief That
Emotions Are
Useless

3.23

0.64

1.5

5

0.03

0

Belief That
Emotions Are
Damaging

2.55

0.84

1

5

0.42

-0.31

0.46

0.38

0

2.04

1.43

2.56

1.88

0.83

0.08

3.97

0.19

-0.36

0.27

0.23

0

1.42

1.7

3.98

57.78

18.86

22

105

0.43

-0.86

Negative
Emotion
Intensity
Emotional
Clarity
Emotional NonAcceptance
Depressive
Symptoms

87

Table 4. Demographic and clinical characteristics of Study 2 participants.
Current Depressed
(n = 48)

Remitted
Depressed (n = 80)

Healthy Control
(n = 87)

Age, Mean (SD, range)
Gender, % Women

41.94 (14.13)a
72.9% a

44.20 (16.30)a
71.3% a

45.45(16.94) a
57.5% a

Race/ethnicity, % Black
Key Study Variables, Mean (SD)
Belief That Emotions Are
Overwhelming and
Uncontrollable
Belief that Emotions Are
Shameful and Irrational

20.8% a

18.8% a

19.8% a

3.62 (.94) a

2.87 (.87)b

2.48(.64) c

2.48 (.84) a

1.99 (.69) b

1.79(.52) b

Belief That Emotions Are
Useless

3.37 (.70) a

3.21(.70) a

3.16(.54) a

Belief That Emotions Are
Damaging

3.14 (.77) a

2.54 (.85) b

2.23(.69) c

Negative Emotion Intensity
(Retrospective)

29.91 (7.85) a

21.20 (7.35) b

17.17(5.63) c

.73 (.41) a

.44(.29) b

.34(.35) c

41.64(12.11) a

47.64(10.16) b

51.24(8.83) c

1.8(.82) a

1.95(.79) a

1.87(.88) a

Emotional Non-Acceptance
(Retrospective)

22.27(7.86) a

27.74(8.11) b

33.11(6.63) c

Emotional Non-Acceptance
(Mean aggregated state)

.40(.25) a

.26 (.18) b

.19(.23)c

77.61(16.49) a

56.54(15.98) b

47.97(13.55) c

Negative Emotion Intensity
(Mean aggregated state)
Emotional Clarity
(Retrospective)
Emotional Clarity (Mean
aggregated state)

Depressive Symptoms

Note: Different subscripts within rows indicate significant pairwise comparisons, p < 0.05. Only
percentages of White and Black groups were compared in race/ethnicity analyses.
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Table 5. Pearson correlations between total scores of Study 2 variables.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Belief That
Emotions Are
Overwhelming 1
and
Uncontrollable

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2. Belief that
Emotions Are
Shameful and
Irrational

0.55***

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

3. Belief That
Emotions Are
Useless

0.13†

0.25***

1

-

-

-

-

-

4. Belief That
Emotions Are
Damaging

0.61***

0.62***

0.17*

1

-

-

-

-

5. Negative
Emotion
Intensity

0.40***

0.28***

0.02

0.27***

1

-

-

-

6. Emotional
Clarity

-0.14*

-0.14*

-0.02

-0.12*

-0.01

1

-

-

7. Emotional
NonAcceptance

0.39***

0.37***

0.08

0.35***

0.84***

-0.03

1

-

8. Depressive
Symptoms

0.52***

0.36***

0.17*

0.42***

0.40***

-0.21**

0.37***

1

Note: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

89

Appendix
Indirect Effects of Beliefs About Emotion on Depressive Symptoms through Globally
Assessed Non-Acceptance of Emotion in Study 2 Sample
A structural equation model was fit to the data such that beliefs about emotions led to
depressive symptoms through global self-reported non-acceptance of emotion, with direct
pathways from beliefs about emotions to depressive symptoms. An examination of absolute fit
indices indicated that this model was not a good fit to the data. The chi square value was
significant, 2(2007) = 4373.32, p < .001. The CFI value was below .9, indicating poor model fit
(CFI = .75). The SRMR value was above .08 (SRMR = .12) and the RMSEA value was above
.06 (RMSEA = .08), which also indicate poor model fit.
As expected, beliefs about emotions significantly and positively predicted nonacceptance of emotion, B = .72, SE(B) = .16, p < .001. However, age was not a significant
moderator of this association, B = .008, SE(B) = .002, p = .88. Also as expected, non-acceptance
of emotion significantly predicted depressive symptoms, B = .21, SE(B) = .06, p = .04. In
addition, there was support for the hypothesized indirect pathway from beliefs about emotions to
depressive symptoms through non-acceptance of emotion; this indirect effect was significant, B
= .15, SE(B) = .07, p = .04.
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